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THIRD STRIKE OR MERELY A FOUL TIP?: THE GROSS
DISPROPORTIONALITY OF LOCKYER V. ANDRADE1
“Let the punishment match the offense.”2

I. INTRODUCTION
“The United States is besieged by an incarceration crisis which far
surpasses that of any other nation.”3 Scholars attribute the increasing
prison population to changes in sentencing policy.4 Politicians have
used the public pressure resulting from its fear of violence to pass
legislation that supports this change in policy and creates more fixed
sentencing structures.5
California’s Three Strikes law (Three Strikes), an example of such
a structure, has resulted in the largest increase in the prison population.6
1. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
2. The Quotations Page, Cicero, at http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7,
2003). Cicero, a lawyer and member of the Roman Senate, was born in 106 B.C. Roman
Philosophy, Cicero, at http://www.wsu.edu:8000/ ~dee/ROME/CICERO.HTM (last visited Nov. 7,
2003). Eighteenth century Americans, including the framers of the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence, studied Cicero’s writings as part of their education. Id.
3. Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California’s
Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 616 (1998). The United States has the
world’s largest prison system, with over two million people in American prisons and jails. Marc
Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491,
1491-92 (2003) [hereinafter Mauer, Collateral Consequences].
4. Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1491. The surge in prison population is
due largely in part to a change in sentencing policies. Id. The trend has moved from indeterminate
sentencing to more fixed sentencing. Id. These fixed sentencing guidelines include mandatory
minimum sentencing and three strikes policies, discussed within this note. Id.
5. Cowart, supra note 3, at 616-17. “Politicians, including presidential candidates, often
prey on constituents’ fears in advancing their own electoral purposes.” Id. Forty-seven percent of
Americans in the year 2000 believed that crime had increased since the past year. Gary LaFree, Too
Much Democracy or Too Much Crime? Lessons from California’s Three-Strikes Law, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 875, 898 (2002) (book review). Sixty-eight percent of Americans in 2000 believed
that criminals are not dealt with harshly enough by the courts. Id. at 899. As of 2000, sixty-three
percent of Americans believed in the death penalty. Id.
6. See infra note 225 (discussing the number of offenders incarcerated in California under
Three Strikes since its inception).
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Public pressure, spurred by the fear of violent criminals being released
and committing the same crimes again and again, led to the enactment of
Three Strikes.7 However, the public, who now finds problems with this
law and its disproportionate impact, has retracted their support for it.8
Three Strikes is so disproportionate that an offender can be sentenced to
life imprisonment for stealing a $20 bottle of vitamins9 or shoplifting a
single magazine.10
The decision in Lockyer illuminates Three Strikes’ disproportionate
impact.11 In this case, the sentence given under Three Strikes was so
grossly disproportionate to the offense that it rose to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment.12 The trial court completely ignored on-point
precedent from a materially indistinguishable case that held a similar
sentence grossly disproportionate and a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.13 By misapplying Supreme Court precedent and imposing
7. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons behind the passage
of Three Strikes).
8. See Walter L. Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20
WHITTIER L. REV. 577, 599 (1999). See also infra note 218 (discussing how the main proponent of
Three Strikes stopped supporting the law). “In the first three strikes case in San Francisco, the
seventy-one year old victim refused to testify at the preliminary hearing, even after the judge
threatened to jail her.” Gordon, supra, at 599. The defendant was facing sentencing under Three
Strikes because he had been convicted of eleven previous felonies and burglary of the victim’s car.
Id. Most of the defendant’s other felonies were for burglary. Id. The victim did not believe the law
was just and, therefore, she refused to testify. Id. In Santa Clara County, a jury refused to return a
guilty verdict for drug possession after learning that the defendant would be sentenced under Three
Strikes. Id. A Santa Barbara Municipal Court Judge reduced a felony charge to a misdemeanor in
order to avoid sentencing the defendant under Three Strikes. Id. at 602. During the process, she
called the law “a piece of junk” and “a stupid piece of law.” Gordon, supra, at 602.
9. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?: Despite the Promises of
Political Leaders and Others Who Have Promoted Them as Effective Tools for Fighting Crime,
“Tough on Crime” Policies Have Proved to be Costly and Unjust, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 9
(1999) [hereinafter Mauer, Promises]. Michael Riggs, a man with prior convictions, stole vitamins
from a supermarket store. Id. He had been homeless and a drug addict since the death of his son.
Id. For his “crime” he received the sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment. Id. This
disproportionate effect is exacerbated by pointing out that Riggs’ offense, when not prosecuted
under Three Strikes, carries only a six-month sentence. Id.
10. B.E. WITKIN, NORMAN L. EPSTEIN & MEMBERS OF THE WITKIN LEGAL INSTITUTE,
WITKIN & EPSTEIN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 355, (3d ed. Supp. 2003) [hereinafter WITKIN &
EPSTEIN]. Romero received a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for this petty theft because
his past convictions for lewd conduct and battery subjected him to sentencing under Three Strikes.
Id.; People v. Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1418, 1424 (2002).
11. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing Lockyer and the Supreme
Court’s decision).
12. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (discussing why the Lockyer decision was
unconstitutional).
13. See infra notes 127, 200-03 and accompanying text (discussing that Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983) overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) is on-point with Lockyer
and the trial court ignored it).
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a grossly disproportionate sentence, the trial court acted
unconstitutionally in its sentencing.14
This Note will explore the proportionality of Three Strikes, issues
implicated by the law, and whether the legislation should continue to
exist.15 Section II discusses the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, Three Strikes, and the three major cases dealing with
sentencing proportionality.16 Section III discusses Lockyer v. Andrade
and its history.17 Section IV discusses whether there is a proportionality
principle attached to the Eighth Amendment, whether the policy goals
behind Three Strikes are being achieved, whether Three Strikes is
economically efficient, and whether Three Strikes has caused any
adverse effects on convicts or the judicial system.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.19 The Fourteenth
Amendment20 applies the Eighth Amendment to the States.21 The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
contains a gross disproportionality provision.22
14. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionality of the
sentence in Lockyer).
15. See infra notes 155-203 and accompanying text (discussing whether there is a
proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment and whether Andrade’s sentence was
proportional). See also infra notes 204-47 and accompanying text (discussing the economic and
policy reasons behind Three Strikes and whether the law is efficient and effective).
16. See infra notes 19-110 and accompanying text for Section II.
17. See infra notes 111-154 for Section III.
18. See infra notes 155-247 for Section IV.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
21. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991) (applying the Eighth Amendment to the
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
22. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). “A gross disproportionality principle is
applicable to sentences for terms of years.” Id. But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95. Mandatory
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B. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)23
The AEDPA places limitations on a “federal habeas court’s review
of a state-court decision”24 and is used by courts when deciding whether
a sentence is grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.25
When deciding whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus26 should be
issued, the most important question under the AEDPA is “whether a
state court decision is contrary to,27 or involved an unreasonable
application of,28 clearly established29 Federal law.”30
sentences are not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. Although they may be cruel, they are
not unusual. Id. at 994-95. The Court found that simply because a sentence is mandatory does not
qualify it as cruel and unusual if it was not otherwise so. Id. at 995.
23. S.735. 104th Cong. § 104 (1996) (limiting federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1996)).
24. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70.
25. Id. An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1996). AEDPA
“modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent
federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent
possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
26. Habeas corpus is defined as “[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most
frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999). In 1867, Congress enacted a statute providing that federal courts
“shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United
States.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 (2000) (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1,
14 Stat. 385).
27. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71.
[A] state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.”
Id. at 73 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406; Bell, 535 U.S. at 694). For example, in Lockyer, the
California Court of Appeal’s decision must have been contrary to the “clearly established gross
proportionality principle.” Id.
28. Id. at 75. A state court unreasonably applies Federal law if it “identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. The state court’s application must be “objectively
unreasonable” not merely “incorrect or erroneous.” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
“Section 2254(d)(1) permits a federal court to grant habeas relief based on the application of a
governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was
announced.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76.
29. Id. at 71-72. “Clearly established” law is the United States Supreme Court’s holdings not
dictum, as of the time the state court made its decision. Id. A federal habeas court can only apply
law that existed “at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 381
(quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). “A rule that ‘breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, falls outside this universe of federal law.”
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C. California’s Three Strikes Law (Three Strikes)
Three Strikes was first proposed by Mike Reynolds, a father whose
daughter was murdered.31 Three Strikes’ ultimate passage was most
importantly influenced by the murder of Polly Klaas.32 After this
murder, then California Governor Pete Wilson33 picked up on Three
Strikes as important crime-fighting legislation.34 Democrats controlled
the state legislature and they agreed to pass any crime legislation
proposed by Wilson, a Republican, in order to prevent him from using
the issue to gain reelection.35 Three Strikes was signed into law on
March 7, 1994, with almost no analysis by academics or criminal justice
experts.36
Three Strikes requires a court to impose a sentence twice as long as
Id. at 381. Only decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States are relevant law under the
AEDPA. Id. A generalized standard may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes. Id. at 382. “If
the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence,
then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications
themselves create a new rule.” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992).
30. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). The Supreme Court concedes
that determining what is “clearly established” under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is difficult.
Id. Nevertheless, gross disproportionality is one “clearly established” principle. Id.
31. LaFree, supra note 5, at 876 (discussing the history of Three Strikes). Mike Reynolds is a
photographer from Fresno whose 18-year-old daughter, Kimber Reynolds, had been shot in the head
on June 30, 1992 “during an attempted robbery of her purse as she exited a local restaurant.” Id.
See also Autumn D. McCullogh, Note and Comment, Three Strikes and You’re In (For Life): An
Analysis of the California Three Strikes Law as Applied to Convictions for Misdemeanor Conduct,
24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 277, 279 (2002) (discussing why Three Strikes was promulgated).
Michael Davis, a convicted criminal, was linked to Kimber’s death and subsequently killed by
police officers outside an apartment building. Id. at 280 n.17. Douglas David Walker was also
linked to Kimber’s death. Id. He pled to a lesser charge and was only sentenced to nine years in
prison. Id.
32. LaFree, supra note 5, at 876-77 (discussing why Three Strikes was promulgated). Polly
Klaas, a twelve year old girl, was abducted from her home in Petaluma, California in October 1993
by a violent offender who had been convicted twice previously and recently been paroled from state
prison. Id. at 877. He confessed to sexually assaulting and murdering Polly and led police to her
body. Id.
33. Peter Wilson was born in Illinois on August 23, 1933. California Governors, at
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/cond/governor/wills/bro.html. He graduated from Yale
and served as a Marine before earning a University of California law degree. Id. He served as a
Senator, Mayor of San Diego, and Assemblyman, as well as Governor of California. Id. He brags
about being the first governor to “turn career criminals into career inmates.” California Voter
Foundation, Remarks by Governor Pete Wilson on Primary Night (June 7, 1994), available at
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/cand/governor/wils/wilsspeech1.htm.
He also holds
particular dislike for rapists and child molesters stating that “for those animals, their first strike
should be their last.” Id.
34. Lafree, supra note 5, at 877.
35. Id.
36. Id. There was no time for analytical attention because of time pressures imposed by
public outrage over the Polly Klaas case. Id.
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the one a defendant would have received if the defendant has one prior
strike and is convicted of another felony.37 A defendant who is
convicted of a felony and who has two or more prior strikes must receive
an indeterminate sentence.38 A prior strike consists of a serious or
violent crime.39 However, the offense that triggers the enhanced
sentencing may be any felony.40 A third strike may also be a “wobbler
offense,” which can be charged either as a misdemeanor or as a felony.41
Wobbler offenses are of particular significance when it comes to petty
theft.42
Three Strikes is one of the harshest recidivist statutes43 in the
United States.44 For example, double counting is incorporated into
37. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 281 (discussing the voters’ intent in passing Three Strikes).
See infra note 39 and accompanying text (defining what a prior strike is).
38. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 281. “[T]he minimum term of [this indeterminate sentence]
is the greater of three possibilities: 1) three times the sentence for the current felony conviction; 2)
state imprisonment for twenty-five years; or 3) the sentence as determined by the court for the
instant conviction, plus any applicable enhancements.” Id. Each of these sentencing options
guarantees that the minimum sentenced received will be twenty-five years to life. Id. This structure
also ensures that there will be no eligibility for parole until twenty-five years have been served. Id.
39. Id. Violent crimes include “murder, mayhem, rape, forcible sex crimes, child molestation,
robbery, and kidnapping.” Id. at 281-82. There are twenty-seven serious crimes including
“burglary, arson, and providing illegal drugs to a minor.” McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282.
Juvenile adjudications and out-of-state convictions qualify as prior strikes if they meet the serious or
violent definition as determined by California law. Id. at 283.
40. Id. There are “over 500 offenses classified as felonies in California.” Id. at 282.
41. Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) rev’d, 538 U.S.
63 (2003). A “wobbler” offense is punishable by up to one year in county jail as a misdemeanor or
up to three years in state prison as a felony. Id. A prosecutor has discretion to charge a “wobbler”
offense as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Id. A Judge has discretion to reduce a felony charge
to a misdemeanor at sentencing. Id. Examples of “‘wobbler offenses’ are: petty theft with a prior,
receiving stolen property, grand theft, commercial burglary, and possession of methamphetamines.”
See Alex Ricciardulli, The Broken Safety Valve: Judicial Discretion’s Failure to Ameliorate
Punishment Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (2002) (listing
other “wobbler” offenses).
42. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282 (giving an overview of Three Strikes). “If petty theft is
committed subsequent to prior convictions for non-theft offenses, even where the priors are serious
and/or violent, then the petty theft must be charged as a misdemeanor and will not trigger three
strikes sentencing.” Id. “If, however, petty theft is committed after a prior theft conviction, the
petty theft will be charged as petty theft with a prior, a felony that will subject the defendant to three
strikes sentencing.” Id.
43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999). A recidivist statute is one directed at
the sentencing of criminals who have been “convicted of multiple offenses.” See id.
44. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282 (comparing Three Strikes to other recidivist statutes).
A court cannot suspend a prison sentence or grant probation. Id. An offender can only be
committed to state prison. Id. The length of time between the prior strikes and the triggering
offense is not considered a mitigating factor. Id. at 282-83. The terms of imprisonment must be
imposed consecutively as opposed to concurrently. Id. at 283. Good-time and work-time credits,
which can reduce a convicted criminal’s sentence, are drastically limited. Id. Offenders cannot
receive such credits until actually in prison and 80% of their sentence must be served before they
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Three Strikes.45 Three Strikes also “imposes certain obligations and
powers upon the prosecution”46 such as the prosecutor must plead and
prove all prior strikes and the prosecutor may dismiss prior strikes
because it is in the interest of justice to do so or because of insufficient
evidence.47 Three Strikes targets career criminals because they pose the
“greatest threat to public safety.”48
D. Major Precedents
1. Rummel v. Estelle49
In 1973, Rummel was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses.50 Since Rummel had two prior convictions, which qualified
are eligible to receive such credits. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 283. Offenders who are
sentenced to indeterminate life sentences must serve their entire minimum term before they can be
eligible for parole. Id. “[T]wo prior strikes can result from a single past criminal act.” Id.
45. Id. Double counting occurs because “a prior strike conviction can both trigger a second or
third strike sentence and increase the sentence for the current offense by an additional five years
under an earlier sentencing enhancement for serious felonies.” Id. “[T]he same conviction that can
trigger a second or third strike sentence may also increase the sentence by an additional year if the
prior strike conviction resulted in a prison commitment.” Id. “[A] prior strike can further be used
to simultaneously trigger a second or third strike sentence and to provide an element of the current
offense, as in the crimes of felony petty theft with a prior and felon in possession of a weapon.”
McCullogh, supra note 31, at 283. “‘[S]erious’ or ‘violent’ felony convictions imposed prior to the
law’s enactment in 1994 can be charged as strikes.” Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747 (citing People v.
Kinsey, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1621, 1631 (1995)).
46. McCullough, supra note 31, at 283.
47. Id. at 283-84 (discussing the safety valve provided by Three Strikes). By giving the
prosecutor the power to dismiss prior strikes, Three Strikes gives prosecutors broad discretion. Id.
at 284. This ability to dismiss prior strikes in the interest of justice is extended to the trial court. Id.
However, a trial court’s power to dismiss prior strikes is more limited than the prosecutor’s. Id.
The trial court must consider “both the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of
society represented by the People, in determining whether there should be a dismissal.” Id.
48. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003). “As one of the chief architects of
California’s three strikes law has explained: ‘Three Strikes was intended to go beyond simply
making sentences tougher.’” Id. (quoting James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law:
History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 12 (2000)). “‘It was intended to be
a focused effort to create a sentencing policy that would use the judicial system to reduce serious
and violent crime.’” Id. (quoting Ardaiz, supra). The policy choice behind any three strikes law is
that “individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior, and whose
conduct has not been deterred by more conventional approaches to punishment, must be isolated
from society in order to protect the public safety.” Id.
49. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that state legislatures have discretion in deciding sentencing
guidelines).
50. Id. at 266. Rummel promised to repair an air conditioner and accepted payment to do so.
Id. at 286 (Powell, J., dissenting). The air conditioner was never repaired. Id. Because the amount
was greater than $50 this offense was felony theft. Id. Felony theft is punishable by two to ten
years in the state penitentiary. Id. at 266.
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as prior strikes,51 the prosecutor proceeded against Rummel as a
recidivist.52 The jury found Rummel guilty of felony theft and also
found that he had been convicted of two prior felonies.53 Rummel was
sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary.54 Rummel
appealed his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment.55
The United States Supreme Court found that the length of a
sentence was a matter for the legislatures to decide.56 Rummel claimed
that the absence of violence in his crimes should militate against the
imposition of such a severe sentence, but the Court rejected this
proposition.57 Rummel would have received more lenient sentences in
almost every other state; however, the differences in the laws of other
States are minimal.58 In addition, a comparison and determination of
whether the sentence is disproportionate fails to take into account Texas’
liberal parole policy.59 Even if the sentence imposed on Rummel was
the most severe sentence found in any of the states, this does not
51. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265. In 1964, Rummel pled guilty to obtaining $80 worth of goods
through fraudulent use of a credit card. Id. This was felony theft and Rummel was sentenced to
three years in the state penitentiary. Id. In 1969, Rummel pled guilty to passing a forged check in
the amount of $28.36. Id. at 265-266. This offense was punishable by two to five years
imprisonment. Id. Rummel was sentenced to four years in the state penitentiary. Id. at 266.
52. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. A recidivist is defined as “[o]ne who has been convicted of
multiple criminal offenses, usually similar in nature.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed.
1999).
53. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266.
54. Id. Texas’ recidivist statute required a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of
parole in the state penitentiary for anyone convicted of a felony that had been convicted of two prior
felonies, but only if each prior felony conviction resulted in a prison sentence. Id. at 278.
55. Id. at 267. Rummel claimed his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate as
against the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
56. Id. at 274. “[A]ny ‘nationwide trend’ toward lighter, discretionary sentences must find its
source and its sustaining force in the legislatures, not in the federal courts.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at
284.
57. Id. at 275. Society still has an interest in punishing and deterring a particular crime by
punishing it severely even though it lacked violence. Id. High corporate officials can commit the
serious crimes of bribery or anti-trust violations or violations of environmental standards which are
not violent offenses, but still serious. Id.
58. Id. at 279. This excludes Texas, West Virginia, and Washington. Id. However, in some
states, such as Colorado, Nevada, and Wyoming, life sentences are triggered by four felonies, not
three. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279-80. Some states, such as Mississippi, require a violent felony
conviction before imposing a life sentence. Id. Other states, such as Washington D.C., Idaho, and
Oklahoma, leave the sentencing decision within the discretion of the judge. Id.
59. Id. The liberal policy of granting good time credits to prisoners usually allows a prisoner
to become eligible for parole in twelve years. Id. Because Rummel has no right to parole, his
sentence cannot be treated as a sentence of only twelve years. Id. However, this liberal policy
cannot be ignored when determining if Rummel’s sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81. Possibility of parole distinguishes Rummel from a person sentenced
in Mississippi, which provides for a sentence without parole on the third strike. Id. at 281.
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necessarily make Rummel’s sentence grossly disproportionate to his
offenses.60 Each state legislature is entitled to make its own judgments
on what sentences should be imposed for different crimes.61 Therefore,
the Court affirmed Rummel’s sentence.62
Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.63 First,
the dissent believed that “the penalty for a noncapital offense may be
unconstitutionally disproportionate.”64 Second, “the possibility of parole
should not be considered in assessing the nature of the punishment.”65
Third, “a mandatory life sentence is grossly disproportionate as applied
to petitioner.”66 Fourth, “the conclusion that this petitioner has suffered
60. Id. Absent national uniformity, which is against the notion of federalism, one State will
always be the one to treat offenders the harshest. Id. at 282. For example, California considers the
theft of avocados or citrus fruit as particularly repugnant; in some States, such as Idaho, theft of
$100 is punishable by a fine, in another State, such as Nevada, it could be punishable by 10 years in
prison. Id.
61. Id. at 284. The legislature’s determination of what sentence to impose for particular
crimes is only confined by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments which “can be informed by objective factors.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284. The purpose
of recidivist statutes is to deter repeat offenders and to segregate a person who commits criminal
offenses repeatedly from the rest of society. Id.
62. Id. at 285.
63. Id. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 286. Disproportionality analysis focuses on whether a person deserves the
punishment meted out, not whether the punishment serves some societal goal. Id. at 288. The
principle of disproportionality comes from English law. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The Magna Carta of 1215 insured that an offense should be fined according to the
gravity of the crime. Id. at 288-89. By 1400, common law agreed “that punishment should not be
excessive either in severity or length.” Id. at 289. The “cruel and unusual punishments clause of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689” was a “reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate
penalties.” Id. at 289. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the defendant was
convicted of falsifying a public record and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with chains, the loss
of his civil rights, and perpetual surveillance. Id. The Court found the punishment was cruel and
unusual. Id. The Court based its decision, in part, on “the relationship between the crime
committed and the punishment imposed.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 289-90 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Court found that Weems “had been punished more severely than persons in the same jurisdiction
who committed more serious crimes, or persons who committed a similar crime in other American
jurisdictions.” Id. at 290.
65. Id. at 286. Notably, Rummel has no right to parole, it is simply an act of executive grace.
Id. at 293. To hold that a sentence is not cruel and unusual nor grossly disproportionate because
parole is probable, is cruel itself because a prisoner “cannot enforce that expectation.” Id. at 294. A
Court has never refused to examine an Eighth Amendment claim because a prisoner might be
pardoned. Id. “In June 1979, the Governor of Texas refused to grant parole to 79% of the state
prisoners whom the parole board recommended for release.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. at 286. Objective factors should be used to determine whether a sentence is grossly
disproportionate. Id. at 295. “Among these are (i) the nature of the offense; (ii) the sentence
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; and (iii) the sentence imposed
upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). All of Rummel’s crimes
involved small amounts of money and none of them involved actual violence, the threat of violence,
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a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles
of judicial restraint and federalism.”67
2. Solem v. Helm68
Helm was convicted by South Dakota of six non-violent felonies69
and, in 1979, he pled guilty of uttering a “no account” check in the
or injury to persons. Id. Since Rummel’s conviction, Texas has reclassified his third offense as a
misdemeanor. Id. “[O]nly 12 States have ever enacted habitual offender statutes imposing a
mandatory life sentence for the commission of two or three nonviolent felonies.” Rummel, 445 U.S.
at 296 (Powell, J., dissenting). “[O]nly 3 States, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia have
retained such a statute.” Id. Therefore, three-fourths of the States that had this scheme have
decided that it does not work. Id. at 296-97. “Kentucky . . . replaced the mandatory life sentence
with a more flexible scheme ‘because of a judgment that under some circumstances life
imprisonment for a habitual criminal is not justified.’” Id. at 297. “Kansas abolished its statute
mandating a life sentence for the commission of three felonies after a state legislative commission
concluded that the legislative policy as expressed in the habitual criminal law bears no particular
resemblance to the enforcement policy of prosecutors and judges.” Id. Washington retains the
Texas scheme, but “the State Supreme Court has suggested that application of its statute to persons
like the petitioner might constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 297-98. “More than threequarters of American jurisdictions have never adopted a habitual offender statute that would commit
the petitioner to mandatory life imprisonment.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., dissenting).
“The jurisdictions that currently employ habitual offender statutes either (i) require the commission
of more than three offenses, (ii) require the commission of at least one violent crime, (iii) limit a
mandatory penalty to less than life, or (iv) grant discretion to the sentencing authority.” Id. at 298
(footnotes omitted). No jurisdiction would require a mandatory life sentence for the commission of
three nonviolent property-related offenses. Id. Congress also has not adopted a scheme like Texas’
statute. Id. at 300. The federal habitual offender statute only requires increased sentences for
“‘dangerous special offender’ [sic] who have been convicted of a felony.” Id. at 299. In order to be
a “dangerous special offender” a felon must have committed at least two previous felonies. Id. One
of the prior felonies must have been committed in the last five years. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 299
(Powell, J., dissenting). The maximum sentence is not to exceed 25 years and should not be
disproportionate to the maximum sentence otherwise authorized for such a felony. Id. Texas’
scheme mandates that a person who is convicted twice of a crime should receive a greater sentence
than an offender who is only convicted once of that crime. Id. at 301. However, the sentence
received for the twice-conviction of a crime such as the unauthorized use of a vehicle is not greater
than the sentence received for the twice-conviction of a greater crime such as rape. Id. Therefore,
when two-time offenders are sentenced, the sentence varies with the severity of the offense, but
three-time felons all receive the same sentence. Id. Imposition of the same sentence on offenders
who commit different crimes raises doubts about the proportionality of the sentence. Id. Review of
the objective factors shows that Rummel’s sentence is grossly disproportionate. Rummel, 445 U.S.
at 302 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 286.
68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983) overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
69. Id. at 279. “In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.” Id.
In 1972, Helm was found guilty of receiving money under false pretenses. Id. at 279-80. In 1973,
he was found guilty of grand larceny. Id. at 280. In 1975, he was convicted of driving while
intoxicated, his third such offense. Id. The only notation in the record regarding these offenses is
that “they were all non-violent, none was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 280.
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amount of $100.70 Because of Helm’s criminal record, he was sentenced
to life imprisonment under South Dakota’s recidivist statute.71 The
United States Court of Appeals reversed the sentence because Rummel
was distinguishable.72 The United States Supreme Court found that the
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause in the Eighth Amendment
prohibits “sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”73
The principle of proportionality is deeply rooted in common law,74
however, “outside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be]
exceedingly rare.”75
Courts should use objective factors when
70. Id. at 281, 282. Helm claims he was working in Sioux Falls when he got his paycheck.
Id. at 281. He was drinking and wound up in Rapid City with more money than he had when he left
Sioux Falls. Id. He does not know how he got that money. Id.
71. Id. at 281, 282. “When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior convictions
in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the
sentence for a Class 1 felony.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 281. “The maximum penalty for a ‘Class 1
felony’ was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine.” Id. Parole is
unavailable under this sentencing scheme. Id. at 282. Although parole is unavailable under this
sentencing scheme, the governor is authorized to commute sentences or pardon prisoners. Id.
Ordinarily the maximum sentence for Helm’s offense is five years imprisonment in the state
penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. Id. at 281.
72. Id. at 283. Helm received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, whereas Rummel could have been paroled in as little as twelve years. Solem, 463 U.S. at
283. “The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm’s offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the same offense” and concluded that Helm’s
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense. Id. at 284.
73. Id.
74. Id. In 1215, the Magna Carta and the First Statute of Westminster declared that
“amercements” (fines) are not to be excessive. Id. Amercements were payments to the King that
were imposed against defendants, plaintiffs who failed to follow court rules, and against entire
townships that did not live up to their obligations, or individuals whom the King felt deserved to be
penalized. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 269 (1989).
Amercements are not the same as damages. Id. at 270 n.13. The Magna Carta placed limits on
when and who could be amerced and the amount. Id. at 270. Most amercements were not large and
were a form of taxation. Id. at 271. Eventually, prison sentences replaced amercements as the
normal criminal sanctions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285. At this point, the common law recognized that
they must also be proportional. Id. This principle was repeated in the English Bill of Rights which
was later adopted by the framers of the Eighth Amendment. Id. When the framers adopted the
same language from the English Bill of Rights they also intended to adopt the English
proportionality principle because it was a theme of the era “that Americans had all the rights of
English subjects.” Id. at 285-86. The Court in Weems, 217 U.S. 349, held that the sentence
imposed was not cruel only because it involved the use of chains, but also because it was “cruel in
its excess of imprisonment.” Id. at 287. The Constitution is explicit that excessive fines are not
permitted and cases have decided that a proportionality analysis must be done to determine that a
death sentence is not excessive. Id. at 289. “It would be anomalous . . . if the lesser punishment of
a fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the
intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 289.
75. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90. Nevertheless, proportionality analysis is applicable to
noncapital cases because no penalty is per se constitutional. Id. at 290.
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conducting a proportionality review.76 The gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty,77 a comparison of “sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction,”78 and a comparison of “the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions”79 are objective factors that should be considered.80
Rummel is essentially different from the case at bar and, therefore, is not
dispositive of the issue.81 By applying the objective factors, the court
76. Id.
77. Id. at 290-91. Helm’s crime did not involve violence and the amount of the check was
relatively small. Id. at 296. All of his prior felonies were non-violent, relatively minor, and none
were against another person. Id. at 296-97. Barring clemency, Helm will spend the rest of his life
in prison. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297. This is the most severe sentence that can be imposed in South
Dakota because they do not have the death penalty. Id. at 297.
78. Id. at 291. “If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.” Id. The other
crimes for which a South Dakota court can impose a life sentence are treason, first degree
manslaughter, murder, first degree arson, and kidnapping. Id. at 298. “Attempted murder, placing
an explosive device on an aircraft, and first degree rape were only Class 2 felonies.” Id.
“Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony.” Id. at 298. “Distribution of heroin and aggravated
assault were only Class 4 felonies.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 298. “[T]he penalty for a second or third
felony is increased by one class.” Id. There is nothing in the record that any recidivist other than
Helm had ever been sentenced as severely for comparable crimes. Id. at 299.
79. Id. Only in Nevada could Helm have received a life sentence without the possibility of
parole for his crime. Id. In addition, the sentence is not mandatory in Nevada, it is merely
authorized. Id. at 299-300. No defendant in Nevada who is in the same position as Helm has ever
actually received this sentence. Solem, 463 U.S. at 299-300.
80. Id. at 290-91. Judges are competent to compare offenses on a relative scale because these
are the types of judgments courts have traditionally had to make. Id. at 292. “Comparisons can be
made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the
offender.” Id. For instance, crimes that involve violence or the threat of violence are more serious
than non-violent crimes. Id. at 292-93. “The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant.” Id.
at 293. For example, stealing a million dollars is sentenced more severely than stealing $100 and a
lesser included offense is punished less severely than the greater offense. Solem, 463 U.S. at 493.
Attempts are not as serious as completed crimes. Id. An accessory after the fact should receive a
lesser sentence than the principal. Id. Negligence is less serious than intentional conduct. Id. A
review of a defendant’s motive is also important. Id. The courts’ ability to compare different
sentences is troublesome because it requires line-drawing. Id. at 294. A 25-year sentence is more
severe than a 15-year sentence, but it is hard to say one violates the Eighth Amendment and the
other does not. Solem, 463 U.S. at 294. However, this is the type of line-drawing courts have to
make in other contexts. Id. An example of this is the Sixth Amendment, which requires that an
accused be provided with a speedy trial, but the permissible delay must be determined on a case-bycase basis. Id. Another example is the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a jury trial. Id. at 295.
The Court has drawn a line by determining that the right to a jury trial is only provided where the
defendant might receive a sentence of six months or more. Id. In choosing this standard, the Court
“relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial for an
offense punishable by more than six months.” Id. This supports the proposition that courts can
distinguish different sentences from each other and that courts may properly look at other
jurisdictions in deciding where to draw the line. Solem, 463 U.S. at 295.
81. Id. at 300. In Rummel, the defendant had the possibility of parole. See supra note 65. In
Solem, the defendant only has the possibility that the governor may commute his sentence. Solem,
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held that Helm’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense
and was, therefore, unconstitutional because it was prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.82
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor
dissented.83 They found that the majority ignored recent precedent.84
The majority’s holding cannot be reconciled with Rummel, yet the
majority did not overrule it.85 The Rummel Court rejected the analysis
used by the majority in this case.86 Legislatures are better equipped to
balance the differing interests in order to determine what the appropriate
sentences for different crimes should be.87

463 U.S. at 300. Commutation is essentially different than parole. Id. Parole is a normal
expectation in the criminal system and is a regular part of the system. Id. The law specifies
standards and procedures for when prisoners should be granted parole and specifies when a prisoner
is eligible for such. Id. To some extent, it is possible to predict when parole will be granted. Id. at
301. Commutation has no such standards. Id. A governor may grant clemency at any time and for
any reason. Solem, 463 U.S. at 301. Finally, Texas has a rather liberal parole policy. Id. It is much
more difficult to obtain commutation in South Dakota. Id. at 302. It has been over eight years since
a life sentence has been commuted. Id. Even if Helm’s sentence was commuted, he would still
only be eligible for parole. Id. In South Dakota, Helm must serve three-fourths of his sentence
before he would be eligible for parole. Id. at 303.
82. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. Helm received the highest sentence possible for a relatively
minor offense. Id. “He has been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes.” Id. “He has been treated more harshly than he would have been
in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.” Id.
83. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the precedent set by Rummel had not been
followed by the majority. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 304. The Court in Solem held that a life sentence imposed after a seventh felony
was grossly disproportionate, but held in Rummel that a life sentence imposed after only three prior
felonies was not grossly disproportionate. Id. Comparing Helm’s crimes to Rummel’s makes
Rummel look like a “model citizen.” Id. Helm was convicted of three burglaries and had a third
conviction for drunk driving. Id. at 304. Helm’s crimes posed a real threat to the public, whereas
Rummel’s did not. Solem, 463 U.S. at 315-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Helm demonstrated his
inability to conform to society’s standards far more than Rummel did. Id. at 316. The distinction
between a life sentence without the possibility of parole and one with the possibility of parole does
not withstand scrutiny. Id. A well-behaved prisoner in Helm’s position is not likely to actually
serve the full life term. Id. Since 1964, twenty-two life sentences in South Dakota have been
commuted to terms of years and twenty-five requests for commutation were denied. Id. at 316-17.
86. Id. at 308. The Rummel Court refused to draw a line between violent and non-violent
offenses. Solem, 463 U.S. at 308 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court also rejected Rummel’s
attempt to draw a comparison between his sentence and sentences in other States for the same
offense. Id. Such comparisons are flawed because laws are widely varying and “some States have
comprehension provisions for parole and others do not.” Id. at 308-09. “Such comparisons trample
on fundamental concepts of federalism.” Id. at 309. Finally, the Rummel Court rejected an attempt
to measure Rummel’s sentence against those imposed for other crimes in Texas. Id. The sentences
imposed for different crimes is a matter of legislative discretion. Id. at 310.
87. Solem, 463 U.S. at 314 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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3. Harmelin v. Michigan88
Harmelin was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.89 Justice
Scalia announced the judgment of the Court.90 He also delivered an
opinion which the Chief Justice joined.91 Justice Scalia concluded by
looking at old English precedent that the Eighth Amendment did not
include a proportionality analysis.92 The cruel and unusual punishment
clause in the American Constitution was meant to be a check upon the
Legislature.93 According to Scalia, the framers of the Constitution did
not mean to include proportionality analysis in the Eighth Amendment
when they included the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments.”94
88. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
89. Id. at 961.
90. Id. The Court affirmed Harmelin’s sentence. Id. at 994-95.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 965. The Magna Carta provided that a fine should be proportional to the offense.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967. When imprisonment became the usual criminal sanction, the
proportionality principle was continued. Id. The drafters of the English Declaration of Rights (Bill
of Rights) knew of this principle, but chose not to prohibit disproportionate sentences. Id. Instead,
they prohibited “cruell and unusuall Punishments.” Id. The preamble to the Declaration of Rights
referred to the illegality of Chief Justice Jeffreys’ sentences rather than the disporportionality of
those sentences. Id. at 969. “[T]he phrase ‘cruell and unusuall’ is treated as interchangeable with
‘cruel and illegal.’” Id. at 973. The Supreme Court observed that “an earlier draft of the
[Declaration of Rights] prohibited ‘illegal’ punishments, and that the change ‘appears to be
inadvertent.’” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring)). At that time, “[n]ot all punishments were specified by statute; many
were determined by the common law.” Id. “Departures from the common law were lawful only if
authorized by statute.” Id. “A requirement that punishment not be ‘unusuall’ . . . was primarily a
requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of common-law tradition.”
Id.
93. Id. at 975-76. The English meaning of the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause cannot
be transplanted to American constitutionalism because “[t]here were no common-law punishments
in the federal system.” Id. at 975. Therefore, the clause must have been meant to prevent the
Legislature from authorizing particular punishments. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975-76.
94. Id. at 977. Proportionality was not a novel idea at the time the constitution was framed.
Id. Many State Constitutions included proportionality provisions. Id. “[T]o use the phrase ‘cruel
and unusual punishment’ to describe a requirement of proportionality would have been an
exceedingly vague and oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying
more directly.” Id. “There is little doubt that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of
Rights were aware of such [proportionality] provisions, yet chose not to replicate them.” Id. The
New Hampshire Constitution (adopted 8 years before ratification of the Eighth Amendment) and the
Ohio Constitution (adopted 12 years after the Eighth Amendment ratification), both contained
provisions against “cruel and unusual punishments” as well as separate proportionality provisions.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977-78. Notably, New Hampshire’s provision prohibited against “cruel or
unusual” punishment. Id. During the debates at the state ratifying conventions only methods of
punishments were discussed, not proportionality. Id. at 979. After the Bill of Rights was proposed,
Congress “punished forgery of United States securities, ‘run[ning] away with [a] ship or vessel, or
any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars,’ treason, and murder on the high seas” with
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There are no clear guidelines for analyzing the proportionality of
punishments as there are with determining whether modes of
punishments are “cruel and unusual.”95 Scalia does admit that there is a
proportionality review in the Eighth Amendment when it comes to the
death penalty.96 Scalia announced the opinion of the Court holding that
mandatory sentences are not unconstitutional.97
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter concurred in the
judgment.98 They found that, although the Court’s proportionality
principles have not been clear, they can be reconciled and stare decisis
the punishment of hanging. Id. at 980-81. Yet, there is no indication that anyone considered these
punishments unconstitutional because they were disproportionate. Id. at 981. During the nineteenth
century many States ratified constitutions that provided for prohibitions against both cruel and
unusual punishments and disproportionate punishments. Id. at 982.
95. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985. A proportionality principle is an invitation to impose
subjective values. Id. This is clear when the three-factor test from Solem is considered. Id. at 986.
The gravity of the offense is difficult to measure because of the variation among ages, generations,
and jurisdictions regarding what offenses are considered serious. Id. at 987. Sodomy is punished
more severely in Massachusetts than assault and battery, while several states do not even punish
sodomy. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 272:34, 265:13(a) (1988)). “In Louisiana, one who
assaults another with a dangerous weapon faces the same maximum prison term as one who
removes a shopping basket ‘from the parking area or grounds of any store . . . without
authorization.’” Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:37, 14:68.1 (West 1986)). Also, “a battery
that results in ‘protracted and obvious disfigurement’ merits imprisonment ‘for not more than five
years,’ one half the maximum penalty for theft of livestock or an oilfield seismograph.” Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 987 (cites omitted) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34.1, 14:67.1, 14:67.8 (West
1986)). Regarding the second factor, if there is no objective standard of gravity, then one cannot
compare sentences of similar gravity from different jurisdictions. Id. at 988. In addition, even if
crimes could be said to be “similarly grave,” they still could not be compared because there are
many justifications for differing sentences. Id. Crimes that are difficult to detect may require
higher penalties. Id. at 989. Crimes that are not deterred by penalty and crimes that are committed
once in a lifetime by citizens who will not benefit from rehabilitation may require lower
punishments. Id. The third factor has no relevance to the Eighth Amendment. Id. States may
punish acts that other states reward, for example, killing an endangered animal. Harmelin, 501 U.S.
at 989. States may punish an act more severely that other states are more lenient with or do not
punish at all. Id. Nothing in the Constitution requires states to treat certain offenses in the same
manner. Id. at 990. “The substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the
legislature” becomes apparent when the judiciary begins to look at the proportionality of offenses,
except in non-debatable cases. Petitioner’s Brief at 18, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
(No. 01-1127). But see Respondent’s Brief at 30-32, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No.
01-1127) (discussing the subjectivity of not having a proportionality principle). The legislature
could impose virtually any sentence it subjectively chose if there was no proportionality review of
sentences. Id. at 30. Therefore, without a proportionality review, there is an invitation to impose
subjective values of the legislature. Id.
96. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994. “Death is different.” Id.
97. Id. at 994-95. “Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense.” Id. at 994. In addition, there remains the possibility of executive clemency.
Id. at 996. Executive clemency is “the power of the President or a governor to pardon a criminal or
commute a criminal sentence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (7th ed. 1999).
98. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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requires that they be followed.99 They stated that there are some
common principles regarding proportionality,100 and by using the
objective factors, Harmelin’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate
to his crime.101
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.102 They thought
it is illogical to presume that the Eighth Amendment would restrict the
power to fine, but leave the power to imprison wholly unrestrained.103
Whether or not the framers of the Constitution intended the Eighth
Amendment to include a proportionality principle with regards to
sentencing, prior decisions of the Court have found that the principle is
included.104 The Solem analysis105 should be applied in proportionality
99. Id. A proportionality principle had existed for 80 years at the time of this decision (1990).
Id. The first case to recognize proportionality was Weems, 217 U.S. 349. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
997. The case interpreted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting “greatly disproportioned”
sentences. Id. (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 371).
100. Id. at 998. The first common principle is that the fixing of prison terms is at the discretion
of legislatures. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The legislatures are best able
to balance the “sanctity of the individual, the nature of the law, and the relation between law and the
social order.” Id. Legislatures should be granted substantial deference in making these decisions.
Id. at 999. The second common principle is that the Eighth Amendment does not require the
adoption of a single penological theory. Id. The third common principle is that large variances in
sentencing theories and the length of the sentences are inevitable. Id. The fourth common principle
is that objective factors should be used in reviewing the proportionality of sentences. Id. at 1000.
The last common principle is that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Only
extreme, grossly disproportionate, sentences are forbidden. Id.
101. Id. at 1002-05. Harmelin’s crime was not minor; the amount of cocaine he possessed had
the potential of yielding 32,500 to 65,000 doses. Id. at 1002.
[D]rugs relate to crime in at least three ways: (1) A drug user may commit crime because
of drug-induced changes in physiological functions, cognitive ability, and mood; (2) A
drug user may commit crime in order to obtain money to buy drugs; and (3) A violent
crime may occur as part of the drug business or culture.
Id. Since Harmelin’s crime was so serious, no comparative analysis is necessary. Id. at 1004.
“[O]ne factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of a particular sentence.”
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id.
102. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1010.
104. Id. at 1012. In Weems, 217 U.S. 349, the Court stated that “the inhibition [of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause] was directed, not only against punishments which inflict torture,
‘but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged.’” Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 371). Scalia admits that there is a
proportionality principle in death penalty cases. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting).
He fails to explain why the words “cruel and unusual” contain a proportionality principle for some
types of cases, but not others. Id. In addition, there are limitations to a “purely historical analysis.”
Id. at 1014. Time brings changes, therefore, a principle must be capable of “wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth.” Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373). “This is particularly true
of constitutions.” Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373). Without a proportionality analysis, there
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review.106 The dissent concluded that application of the Solem factors
shows that the sentence in this case was grossly disproportionate to the
crime.107
Justices Stevens, while joining in Justice White’s dissenting
opinion, filed a separate dissenting opinion finding that the sentence at
issue here was grossly disproportionate to the offense.108 Justice
would be “no mechanism for addressing a situation such as that proposed in Rummel, in which a
legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.” Id. at 1018. Scalia
claims that such an example would be easy to declare disproportional and would, therefore, never
occur. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). However, “absent a proportionality
guarantee, there would be no basis for deciding such cases should they arise.” Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 70-87 (detailing the Solem analysis).
106. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015 (White, J., dissenting). This “analysis has worked well in
practice.” Id. “Courts appear to have had little difficulty applying the analysis to a given sentence,
and application of the test by numerous state and federal appellate courts has resulted in a mere
handful of sentences being declared unconstitutional.” Id. at 1015. It is clear that courts are not
instituting their own subjective beliefs for those of the legislature. Id. at 1016. All the factors from
Solem should be applied. Id. at 1019. The Court in Solem made it clear that “no one factor will be
dispositive in a given case.”
Id.
Numerous cases have used intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional comparisons of crimes and punishments in making proportionality reviews.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1019 (White, J., dissenting). A court “would have no basis for its
determination that a sentence was – or was not – disproportionate, other than the ‘subjective views
of individual [judges]’” if it only looked at the first Solem factor. Id. at 1020.
107. Id. at 1021. The sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is the most
severe possible sentence, since Michigan has no death penalty. Id. at 1022.
[I]n evaluating the gravity of the offense, it is appropriate to consider “the harm caused
or threatened to the victim or society,” based on such things as the degree of violence
involved in the crime and “[t]he absolute magnitude of the crime,” and “the culpability
of the offender,” including the degree of requisite intent and the offender’s motive in
committing the crime.
Id. (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93). Possession of drugs mostly affects the possessor. Id. The
ripple effect on society is usually a consequence of addiction and not mere possession. Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 1022-23. “Because possession is necessarily a lesser included offense of possession
with intent to distribute, it is odd to punish the former as severely as the latter.” Id. at 1024. The
penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole is reserved for three offenses in Michigan:
“first-degree murder; manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or
distribute 650 grams or more of narcotics; and possession of 650 grams or more of narcotics.” Id. at
1025-26 (cites omitted). Second-degree murder and armed robbery do not carry as harsh a penalty
as the crime at issue here. Id. at 1026. Harmelin has been treated as, or more, severely than
criminals who have committed graver crimes. Id.
No other jurisdiction imposes a punishment nearly as severe as Michigan’s for
possession of the amount of drugs at issue here. Of the remaining 49 States, only
Alabama provides for a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a first-time drug
offender, and then only when a defendant possesses 10 kilograms or more of cocaine.
Id.
108. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun similarly agreed
with Justice White’s dissent while also joining Justice Stevens in his separate opinion. Id. at 1028.
The type of sentence at issue here “must rest on a rational determination that the punished ‘criminal
conduct is so atrocious that society’s interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any
considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator.’” Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 4
DONHAM1.DOC

3/7/2005 11:09 AM

386

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:369

Marshall also separately dissented to restate his opinion that capital
punishment is always “cruel and unusual.”109 Yet Justice Marshall
agreed with Justice White’s finding that there is a general proportionality
requirement in both capital and non-capital cases.110
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Leandro Andrade is a longtime heroin addict.111 On November 4,
1995, he stole five videotapes worth $84.70 from a K-Mart store in
Ontario, California.112 Two weeks later, Andrade stole four videotapes
worth $68.84 from another K-Mart store in Montclair, California.113 In
both cases, store personnel stopped Andrade before he left the
premises.114 Andrade’s heroin addiction prompted these crimes.115

307). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including all relevant enhancements, would have only
sentenced Harmelin to 10 years. Id. at 1029. In most states, the period of imprisonment would be
substantially shorter. Id.
109. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “I adhere to my view that capital
punishment is in all instances unconstitutional.” Id.
110. Id. According to Justice Marshall, if the Court properly applied the proportionality
principle in this case it would have concluded that “mandating life sentences with no possibility of
parole even for first-time drug possession offenders is unconstitutional” because it is disproportional
and the Constitution requires sentences to be proportional. Id.
111. Andrade v. Attorney General of California, 270 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 2001) rev’d, 538
U.S. 63 (2003). Andrade’s pre-sentence report indicates that he has been a heroin addict since
1977. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67 (2003). Heroin addiction occurs quickly. NarcOnon,
Heroin Addiction Treatment, available at http://www.drugaddictiontreatment.info/heroin.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2004). Addicts need more heroin each time in order to satisfy this addiction. Id.
The habit can cost “$100-$200 a day.” Id. This “can cause addicts to quickly turn to lives of
shoplifting, burglary, theft, drug dealing, and prostitution to support their habits.” Id. Recent years
have seen an increase in heroin addiction of 20% mostly due to the fact that it is cheaper, more
potent, and more is available. Id. In California, heroin is “cheap, potent, and plentiful.” Id.
Emergency rooms see two to three overdoses each day. NarcOnon, supra.
112. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.
113. Id. Shoplifting is a problem. See Monifa Marrero, Heavy Lifting: Shoplifters Under the
Microscope,
UVISION
(April
2003),
available
at
http://www.uvi.edu/pubrelations/u_vision/_private/shoplifting.htm. The K-mart store in Lockhart Gardens suffered
$27,000 in losses due to shoplifting from September 2002 to January 2003. Id. Of the $31 billion
in inventory shrinkage, $10 billion resulted from shoplifting. Id. Effects of shoplifting go beyond
the cost to retailers. Id. The average family of four will pay an additional $440 this year in higher
prices. Id. In addition, retailers pay $4.8 million a month for prosecution and protection. Id.
114. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.
115. Id. at 67 (stating that Andrade’s pre-sentence report indicates that he stole the videotapes
in order to support his habit).
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B. Procedural History
1. The Trial Court
The kinds of thefts that Andrade committed are normally
considered minor in California.116 However, petty theft with a prior
conviction is a “wobbler” offense.117 Andrade was previously convicted
of several non-violent offenses.118 Because of Andrade’s previous
conviction for petty theft, the prosecutor charged him with two felonies
instead of misdemeanors.119 Since Andrade had two prior felonies,120
the new felonies were charged as his third and fourth strikes under Three
Strikes.121 The jury found Andrade guilty as charged.122 Andrade was
sentenced to 50 years to life imprisonment.123
116. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749 (discussing that Cal. Penal Code 490 classifies both of these
offenses as petty thefts subject up to six months in county jail and a $1000 fine).
117. Id. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for the definition of a “wobbler” offense.
118. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748-49. Andrade was convicted in 1982 of misdemeanor theft and
drug diversion. Id. He served six days in county jail and received twelve months probation. Id. at
748. In 1983, Andrade pled guilty to three counts of first-degree residential burglary. Id. He was
sentenced to 120 months in prison. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. In 1988, Andrade was convicted of
felony transportation of marijuana. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748-49. He was sentenced to eight years
in prison and served less than one and a half years. Id. at 749. In 1990, Andrade was convicted of
petty theft. Id. He was sentenced to 180 days in jail. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. Again in 1990,
Andrade was convicted of felony transportation of marijuana. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. He was
sentenced to six years in prison, but served less than two and a half years. Id. In 1991, Andrade
received parole for escape from a federal prison. Id.
119. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.
120. Id. The three 1983 burglary convictions were Andrade’s first two strikes. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The trial court denied Andrade’s motions to strike his prior convictions and to reduce
the charges from felonies to misdemeanors. Id. The trial court then bifurcated Andrade’s trial into
two proceedings; the first one to determine whether he committed the current offenses he was
charged with, and the second one to determine whether he had any prior convictions that would
count as prior strikes under Three Strikes. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. He was found guilty of two
counts of petty theft with a prior under California Penal Code 666. Id. The jury also found that he
had been convicted of three counts of residential burglary in 1983. Id.
123. Id. This sentence is made up of two 25 years to life sentences for each of his thefts from
the two K-Mart stores to be served consecutively. Id. Andrade will not be eligible for parole for 50
years because Three Strikes requires the sentences to be served consecutively. Id. (citing Cal. Penal
Code §§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12(a)(6)). Andrade will be 87 years old before he is eligible for parole in
2046. Id. at 750. After receiving the sentence he stated, “I wasn’t aware that for that little mistake I
was going to receive a 25-to-life sentence.” CBS News Stories, Three Strikes (July 9, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/28/60ll/main527248.shtml. One of the two forepersons
on Andrade’s jury, Deborah Freeman, stated that she did not even know what the sentence would be
until after the court handed it down. Id. She stated that it was “ludicrous.” Id. The other
foreperson, Bridget George, was “pretty shocked” at the sentence and declared it “incredibly out of
this world for me for this particular crime.” Id. She stated that “I think it is cruel and unusual
punishment, 50 to life, for stealing videotapes.” Id.
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2. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
Andrade filed several appeals before the case reached the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.124 The Ninth Circuit granted Andrade a
certificate of appealability to raise the Eighth Amendment issue.125 The
court found that Rummel,126 Solem,127 and Harmelin128 were clearly
established federal law under the AEDPA.129 Gross disproportionality
analysis requires a comparison to all three cases.130 The court found that
Andrade’s case was most analogous to Solem and the state court’s
failure to address that case was clear error and, therefore, an
unreasonable application of federal law.131 The court also found that
Andrade’s sentence was grossly disproportionate and a decision to the
contrary was an unreasonable application of federal law.132 The court
124. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Andrade’s conviction
and sentence on May 13, 1997. Id. The opinion was unpublished, but the court rejected the
argument that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
The California Supreme Court denied Andrade’s petition for review and made no comments. Id.
Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. The petition was
denied because “the state court[’s] conclusions . . . were reasonable applications of federal law.” Id.
Judgment was entered on February 19, 1999. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. The district court denied
Andrade’s certificate of appealability. Id.
125. Id. The Ninth Circuit also appointed counsel to Andrade, who had initiated his appeal
proceedings pro se. Id.
126. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of
parole in twelve years for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services
was not cruel and unusual punishment). See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text for a full
analysis of this case.
127. 463 U.S. 277 (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life without the possibility of parole
for uttering a “no account” check for $100 was cruel and unusual punishment). See supra notes 6887 and accompanying text for a full analysis of this case.
128. 501 U.S. 957 (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life without the possibility of parole
for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment). See supra notes 88110 and accompanying text for a full analysis of this case.
129. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766. 28 USC § 2254 is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, which circumscribes a federal habeas court’s review of a state court decision. Lockyer,
538 U.S. at 70.
130. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766.
131. Id. at 766-67. Even though Andrade’s criminal history is close to the defendant’s in both
Rummel and Solem, his life sentence with parole in 50 years is most analogous to the Solem
defendant’s life without the possibility of parole as compared to the Rummel defendant’s life with
the possibility of parole in 12 years. Id. at 765. See also Respondent’s Brief at 17, Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (discussing why Harmelin is distinguishable from the
present case).
132. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767. The court applied the Solem test. Id. at 758. First, the court
found that the sentence was harsh. Id. at 758-59. It was the second most severe sentence available.
Id. at 759. Andrade would not be eligible for parole until he was 87 years old, yet the average life
expectancy of a man was 77 years. Id. It was likely that Andrade would spend the rest of his life in
prison. Id. However, where would this line of reasoning stop? Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 01-1127). What if Andrade had been 20 years old at the time of
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reversed the judgment of the district court.133
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In 2002, the Supreme Court granted California Attorney General

sentencing, what if the statistics on life expectancy change, or should health problems be included in
the calculation? Id. No matter how minimal the possibility of parole for Andrade was, it still
existed, and therefore Andrade’s sentence was not the same as life without the possibility of parole.
Id. But see Respondent’s Brief at 17, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how a fifty years to life
sentence is the equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole). See also 21A AM.
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 954 (2003) (discussing how age is a factor that can be considered in
determining whether a sentence is proportional to the crime). Second, the court found that the
triggering offense was not that grave. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759. It was for a small amount of
money and did not involve violence. Id. Petty theft of this kind is normally a misdemeanor. Id.
Andrade’s prior strike felonies were more than a decade earlier and adjudicated in one proceeding.
Id. at 760. Comparing the severity of the sentence with the gravity of the offense, the court found
an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. at 761. However, the petitioner argued that the absence
of violence or looking at the value of what was taken should not minimize the offense. Petitioner’s
Brief at 12, Lockyer (No. 01-1127). The element of recidivism should play a larger role in
determining the severity of the offense. Id. Society could have an interest in deterring offenses that
do not involve violence. Id. at 13. Californians’ judgment about which offenses should receive
particular sentences should be given deference. Id. But see Respondent’s Brief at 30, Lockyer (No.
01-1127) (discussing how no state should have unlimited discretion in determining sentences).
Performing an intrajurisdictional comparison, the court found that Andrade’s sentence was only
exceeded by first-degree murder and a few violent felonies, such as kidnapping, train wrecking, or
unlawful explosion resulting in death or great bodily injury, but most violent crimes are punished
less severely. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761-62. Andrade’s sentence was twice as long as any of the
sentences for recidivists cited by the state. Id. at 762. See also Respondent’s Brief at 19, Lockyer
(No. 01-1127) (discussing how grossly disproportionate Andrade’s sentence was when compared
with other sentences in the same jurisdiction). However, “Andrade’s sentence is twice as long as
other three-strikes defendants because he committed twice as many offenses.” Petitioner’s Brief at
19, Lockyer (No. 01-1127). Finally, the court performed an interjurisdictional comparison.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762. There are only four other states with recidivist statutes which Andrade’s
offense would qualify for sentencing under: Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana. Id.
at 763. However, Andrade would not have received as severe a sentence in any of those
jurisdictions. Id. See also Respondent’s Brief at 20-21, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how
Andrade’s sentence compares with other sentences for the same crime in different jurisdictions).
See supra note 43 for the definition of a recidivist statute. Petitioner disagrees with any
interjurisdictional analysis because without uniform national guidelines some state will always have
to be the most severe. Petitioner’s Brief at 22, Lockyer (No. 01-1127). But see Respondent’s Brief
at 22, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has looked at a
consensus of the states regarding punishments to determine whether a punishment was grossly
disproportionate). Petitioner also argues that there can be no proportionality review for term of
years sentences because there are no objective factors to apply to “sentences of different lengths.”
Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
133. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767. The writ of habeas corpus is to be issued if the state has not
resentenced Andrade within 60 days of the issuance of this mandate. Id.
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Bill Lockyer’s134 petition for a writ of certiorari.135 The Court undertook
the issue of whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals violated the
AEDPA136 by reversing Andrade’s conviction.137 The first matter the
Court addressed was identifying the clearly established federal law of
the Supreme Court.138 The only clearly established federal law is the
gross disproportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment and its
applicability to terms of years sentences.139 After making this
determination, the Court turned to the main thrust of its decision in
deciding whether the California Court of Appeal’s affirmation of the
sentence140 was “contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of”
the clearly established principle of gross proportionately.141 A writ of
habeas corpus142 was not appropriate in this case because the California
Court of Appeal’s decision was not “‘contrary to’ the governing legal
principles.”143 The Court also did not find that the California Court of
134. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63. Bill Lockyer served in the state Legislature before becoming
California’s Attorney General in 1999.
Office of the Attorney General, at
http://ag.ca.gov/ag/lockyer.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). He played an important role in passing
“hundreds” of toughened criminal laws. Id.
135. Lockyer v. Andrade, 535 U.S. 969 (2002) (granting a petition for writ of certiorari).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The AEDPA “circumscribes a federal habeas court’s review of a statecourt decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).
137. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70. This Court decided whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in finding that Andrade’s sentence of 50 years to life in prison was “contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Id. at 66. The Court chose not to reach the issue of whether the state court erred in imposing two
consecutive 25 years to life prison sentences under Three Strikes. Id. at 71. The Court decided
whether Andrade could obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) on his Eighth Amendment
claim. Id.
138. Id. A petition for habeas corpus can only be granted if a court’s decision is “contrary to”
or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. Id. at 73. The state contends
that gross disproportionality is not clearly defined. Petitioner’s Brief, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63 (2003) (No. 01-1127).
139. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. Supreme Court cases have not established a set of clear factors
to determine gross disproportionality. Id. In Solem, the Court stated that a fifteen-year sentence is
harsher than a twenty-five year sentence, but it would be difficult to say one violates the Eighth
Amendment while the other does not. Id. In Harmelin, the Court stated that Solem was unclear and
the proportionality decisions have not been clear or consistent. Id. Justices Kennedy and Scalia
repeatedly stated in Harmelin that Solem was unclear and that there have been no clear and
consistent proportionality decisions set down by the Supreme Court. Id. Therefore, the contours of
gross disproportionality are unclear and the principle is “applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’
and ‘extreme’ case.” Id.
140. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Andrade’s sentence of
two 25 years to life in prison terms to be served consecutively for a “third strike” conviction. Id.
141. Id. at 73.
142. See supra note 26 for definition of a writ of habeas corpus.
143. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73-4. A decision is “contrary to” federal law “‘if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme
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Appeal’s decision was an “unreasonable application of” federal law.144
The Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.145
2. The Dissent146
The dissent agrees with the majority that gross disproportionality is
part of the Eighth Amendment.147 The dissent also agrees that the term
“gross disproportion” is so general as to provide state courts with
considerable leeway in determining gross disproportionality.148
Nonetheless, the disproportionality review by the state court was
erroneous and unreasonable for two reasons.149 First, Solem is
controlling150 because the facts here are on-point with those in Solem.151
Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Id. at 73 (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). See also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. It was not contrary to the law for the
California Court of Appeals to rely on Rummel in making its decision. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73.
Harmelin and Solem specifically state that they did not overrule Rummel. Id. In addition, the state
court was not presented with facts materially indistinguishable from this case. Id. at 74. Therefore,
the state court could not have “arrived at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Id.
Andrade’s sentence falls between the sentences in Rummel and Solem and, therefore, is not
materially indistinguishable from either. Id. Andrade has the possibility of parole and the
defendant in Solem did not. Id. But see Respondent’s Brief at 17-18, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (discussing how parole in 50 years is equivalent to no parole at all).
However, Andrade is eligible for parole in 50 years whereas Rummel is eligible in 12 years.
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74.
144. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. A state court unreasonably applies federal law if the state court
correctly states the governing principle, but its application of that principle to the facts of the case is
objectively unreasonable. Id. at 75 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). This is not the same as the
decision being clear error. Id. “It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent
review of the legal question’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous’” Id.
(quoting Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753). Legislatures have broad discretion under the governing legal
principle when making a sentence that fits within the proportionality scope. Id. at 76 (citing
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011). It was not objectively unreasonable for the Court of Appeals to
believe that Andrade’s sentence fit within the unclear contours of the proportionality principle. Id.
145. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77.
146. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined in his dissent by Justice Stevens,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. Id.
147. Id. It is “clearly established” that the Eighth Amendment’s exclusion of cruel and unusual
punishments applies to terms of years sentences, and sentences that are “grossly disproportionate to
the offense” are unconstitutional. Id.
148. Id. at 77-8.
149. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Id. Solem is important because it is the Supreme Court’s most recent review of the gross
disproportionality of a recidivist’s sentence and Harmelin established its authority. Id. The case
also established a benchmark in applying the gross disproportionality principle. Id. Life in prison
for uttering a $100 no account check was grossly disproportionate regardless of the defendant’s six
previous non-violent felonies. Id.
151. Id. Andrade and the defendant in Solem (Helm) are both recidivists whose triggering
offense was theft of minimal value. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting). Their criminal
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Since the cases’ facts are the same, the decisions should be the same.152
Second, the policy behind Three Strikes153 cannot support the imposition
of a 25-year-to-life sentence for a second minor felony committed soon
after the triggering offense.154
IV. ANALYSIS
A. There is a Gross Disproportionality Principle in the Eighth
Amendment
Traditionally, proportionality has been a principle in determining
punishments.155 It was included in the Magna Carta, the First Statute of
This tradition
Westminster, and the English Bill of Rights.156
backgrounds are comparable, including burglary (although Andrade’s was residential whereas
Helm’s was not) and no history of violence or crimes against persons. Id. The sentences are also
similar. Id. Even though Andrade’s sentence is supposed to be two different sentences it can only
be understood as one. Id. The thefts were separated by only two weeks, the victim was the same
person, they were both committed for the same reason (to finance a heroin addiction), both offenses
were charged in one indictment, and the state court spoke of the sentences as one, stating that the
sentence carried a 50-year minimum. Id. Because of the 50-year minimum and the fact that
Andrade was 37 years old when sentenced, his sentence is the equivalent of a life without parole
sentence, the same as the sentence in Solem. Id. at 79.
152. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting). The only way to reach a different
sentence is to either deny that parole eligibility after 50 years is not equivalent to having no
possibility of parole or to ignore Solem as authority. Id. A man released after 50 years would have
no real life left even if he was granted parole and survived to see it. Id. “Prison environments are
themselves potentially damaging situations [that have] negative psychological effects.” Craig
Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth
Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POL’Y & L. 499, 504 (1997). Long prison sentences serve to
increase crime. Id. Solem has never been overruled and discounting it is wrong as a matter of law.
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
153. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 80. The policy behind the Three Strikes law is deterrence and
incapacitation to protect the safety of the public. Id.
154. Id. at 79-80. Andrade did not become twice as dangerous because he stole five more
videotapes. Id. at 82. Because the defendant’s condition did not change between the commission of
the two offenses, the sentence cannot be doubled without violating the gross disproportionality
principle in the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 81-2. The second theft did not render Andrade so
dangerous that after 25 years (the date he would be eligible for parole after the first sentence) he
would need to be incarcerated for another 25 years. Id. at 82. There is no other jurisdiction that
would double a sentence merely because two related thefts took place on separate occasions.
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting). See text accompanying supra note 42 for the
definition of a triggering offense.
155. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
156. Id. at 285. The Magna Carta stated that excessive amercements (fines) were not
permitted. Id. at 284. The common law also recognized that prison sentences should be
proportional since they had become normal criminal sanctions. Id. at 285. The English Bill of
Rights, the language of which was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment, stated that “excessive
Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
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contributed to the United States Constitution’s Framers’ intent when
they drafted the Eighth Amendment.157 Because the English Bill of
Rights contained a proportionality principle, when the Framers adopted
its language they also adopted this principle.158 However, some
commentators have questioned whether the English Bill of Rights
actually contained a proportionality principle with regards to
punishments.159 The traditional approach is that only “torture and
barbarous punishments” were prohibited based on the Bloody Assizes.160
inflicted.” Id.
157. Id. at 285-86.
158. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86. “One of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans
had all the rights of English subjects.” Id. at 286. See also Chris Baniszewski, Comment, Supreme
Court Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality
Requirement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 929, 934-35 (1993) (discussing the history of the Eighth
Amendment); Joel E. Hunter, Note, State v. Bonner: In Search of an Objective Eighth Amendment
Analysis for “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” in South Dakota, 44 S.D. L. REV. 399, 399-400
(1999) (discussing how the drafters intended to include proportionality review in the Eighth
Amendment). “Under the English system, both fines and sentences were required to be
proportionate to the crime committed, and were therefore not solely limited to the ‘mode’ of
punishment inflicted.” Id. at 407. The Bill of Rights was drafted to ensure that these rights were
protected. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286. But see supra note 96 (Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin
discussing that the English Declaration of Rights did not include a proportionality principle). Even
if the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to protect more than the English Bill of Rights, the
fact that the Framers used the same language shows their intent to provide the same minimum level
of protection already provided to Englishmen. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286. See also Stephanie E.
Carlson, State v. Pack: Proportionality of Sentences – Should It Be a Necessary Factor in
Determining Whether a Sentence “Shocks the Conscience of the Court?” 40 S.D. L. REV. 130, 141
(1995) (discussing that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle because it was
included in the language of the English Bill of Rights which the framer’s adopted); Barry L.
Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and DesertBased Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
461, 501 (2000) (discussing the same).
159. Baniszewski, supra note 158 (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment). But see
Peter Mathis Spett, Note, Confounding the Gradations of Iniquity: An Analysis of Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence Set Forth in Harmelin v. Michigan, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203,
205 (1992/1993) (discussing that the framers may have had a different meaning of cruel and unusual
in mind other than to prevent excessive punishments).
160. Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 931. The “Bloody Assizes” refers to the Duke of
Monmouth and his compatriots’ trials for treason. Id. The Duke of Monmouth’s uncle inherited the
throne of England, and apparently the Duke was not happy about this. Id. He invaded England but
was defeated and executed. Id. A special commission was created in order to put the Duke’s
supporters on trial. Id. The guilty were executed in the traditional method for traitors, “drawing the
man on a cart to the gallows where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive,
disemboweled and his bowels burnt before him, then beheaded and quartered.” Id. A few years
later, William took the throne and the English Declaration of Rights was written in response to the
public outrage over the executions. Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 931-32. Therefore, this
document was “meant to prohibit torture and barbarous methods of punishments.” Id. at 932. See
also Aisha Ginwalla, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: And Their Object Not “Sublime,
To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” 57 MO. L. REV. 607, 610 (1992) (discussing that one
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However, the meaning of cruel and unusual has evolved into more than
just physical torture.161 A more recent approach suggests that the
English Bill of Rights was a response to the Titus Oates trial in 1685.162
Proponents of this approach believe that the dissenting opinion in Oates’
appeal shows the English Bill of Rights did include a proportionality
principle.163 Another argument is that, given the framer’s interest in
Enlightenment thinking, it is to be expected that they would adopt a
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
proportionality principle.164
Harmelin argued that the evidence of the day proved that the drafters did
not intend to include a proportionality principle in the Eighth
Amendment.165 However, any evidence that the drafters did not intend
argument was that the framers intended to prevent torturous and barbarous punishments).
161. United States v. White, 54 M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2001). “[T]he current standard is that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits ‘punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ . . . or which ‘involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain[.]’” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)).
162. Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 932. Since the types of punishments used during the
“Bloody Assizes” were common for that time period, they cannot be the basis for the Rights that
were adopted. Id. The Oates trial is the “only recorded use of the clause contemporaneous with its
drafting.” Id. Oates perjured himself by falsely accusing several Catholics of plotting the
assassination of the King, resulting in their executions. Id. at 932-33. Since perjurers could no
longer be sentenced to death, the judge sentenced Oates to “a fine of 2,000 marks, life
imprisonment, pillorying four times a year, and whippings from Aldgate to Newgate and two days
later from Newgate to Tyburn.” Id. at 933. The judge also removed Oates’ Canonical Habits. Id.
The House of Lords affirmed Oates sentence, but the recent approach focuses on the dissent.
Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 933.
163. Id. The dissent stated that the punishments were “barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian;
and there is no Precedent to warrant the Punishments of whipping and committing to Prison for
Life, for the Crime of Perjury; which yet were but Part of the Punishments inflicted upon him.” Id.
They concluded that the “Judgments were contrary to Law and ancient Practice, and therefore
erroneous.” Id. at 934. The House of Commons reversed Oates’ sentence as unauthorized. Stephen
T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 44 (2000).
164. Ginwalla, supra note 160, at 610.
165. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011. Justice Scalia concluded that since the Framers had
examples of multiple state constitutions to choose from, which contained specific proportionality
requirements and chose not to use the same language, they did not intend to include a
proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment. Mary K. Woodburn, Note, Harmelin v.
Michigan and Proportionality Review Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1927, 1936
(1992). “Both the New Hampshire Constitution, adopted 8 years before ratification of the Eighth
Amendment, and the Ohio Constitution, adopted 12 years after, contain, in separate provisions, a
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ and a requirement that ‘all penalties ought to be
proportioned to the nature of the offence.’” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977-78. See also Margaret P.
Spencer, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War Against Drugs:
Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 360 (1995) (stating
the same); Johnson, supra note 158, at 502-03 (stating the same). Only certain modes of
punishment were prohibited by the English Bill of Rights. See Spencer, supra. However, this
argument fails to realize that the Court gave the Eighth Amendment an “evolving meaning.” Id. at
361.
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to include a proportionality principle in the Constitution is still
insufficient to overcome “the reach of the words that otherwise could
reasonably be construed to include it.”166
For almost a century, the principle of proportionality has been
recognized in this country.167 The majority of the Justices have found a
proportionality principle within the Eighth Amendment.168 The first
case in the United States to find a proportionality principle was Weems
v. United States.169 The court found that “[T]he inhibition [of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause] was directed, not only against
punishments which inflict torture, ‘but against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offenses charged.’”170
The text of the Eighth Amendment itself evidences a
proportionality principle.171 It states that fines and bails are not to be

166. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia failed to account for the
fact that “constitutional language is often ‘boilerplate.’” Woodburn, supra note 165, at 1936-37. In
addition, the States likely interpreted the broad language in the Eighth Amendment to encompass
the language in their constitutions. Id. at 1937. This is supported by the fact that there was little
protest during the conventions. Id. In all likelihood, States would have protested if they believed
the United States Constitution was significantly different from their own constitutions. Id. Since
the Eighth Amendment contains such general language, the Framers intended future generations to
define the clause since the “meaning of a constitutional provision can change over time” and
“situations may arise which the Framers never could have contemplated.” Id.
167. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286. The first case to find a proportionality principle was decided in
1910. Id. at 287. See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that, under
the principle of stare decisis, a proportionality principle has existed for 80 years).
168. Hunter, supra note 158, at 407-08. See also Parr, supra note 163, at 41 (discussing the
same); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments,
Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages - Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing
Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 224-25 (2003) (discussing that at least six current
Supreme Court Justices agree that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle);
Michael J. O’Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1389, 1400 (2003) (discussing the same). A sentence may
violate the Eighth Amendment if it is not proportionate to the crime that resulted in the defendant’s
conviction. Esparza v. Lockyer, No. C 99-3781 CRB (PR), 2001 WL 1528384, *10 (N.D. Cal.)
(finding that two 25 years to life sentences for drunk driving was not disproportionate). See also
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (finding that proportionality between sentences and crimes has been
constitutionally recognized for almost one hundred years in the United States); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (finding that excessive sanctions are prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S 782, 788 (1982) (finding that the Eight Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment clause includes a disproportionality principle); Carmona v. Ward, 439
U.S. 1091, 1093-94 (1979) (finding that proportionality between a crime and its punishment is a
firmly rooted principle).
169. 217 U.S. 349 (finding that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle and
a comparative analysis should be used to determine whether a sentence is disproportionate).
170. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289.
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excessive.172 This implies that punishments are not to be excessive
either.173 As Justice White has stated, “[i]n cases where the courts have
a discretionary power to fine and imprison, shall it be supposed, that the
power to fine is restrained, but the power to imprison is wholly
unrestricted by it?”174 Justice Scalia would claim such, but his reasoning
is weak because his arguments would reduce the Eighth Amendment to
meaningless words.175
In contrast, the utilitarian policies behind punishments –
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation – do not support a
proportionality requirement.176 Utilitarian theories are forward-looking
to future behavior, harm, and benefits, whereas proportionality is
backward-looking to the seriousness of the offense committed.177
Mandatory sentencing laws, such as Three Strikes, do not work because
they leave no room for consideration of these goals when determining
the appropriate sentence.178
The policy that supports proportionality is retribution.179 Under a
retribution theory, the seriousness of the crime “conveys the magnitude
of the censure.”180 Therefore, it would be unjust to not proportion
172. Id. See supra note 19 for the text of the Eighth Amendment.
173. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. “It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the
intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.” Id. See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009
(White, J., dissenting) (discussing the text of the Eight Amendment); Eli Velasquez, The Shaping of
an American Consensus Against the Execution of Mentally Retarded Criminals: A Case Note on
Atkins v. Virginia, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 955, 980 (2003) (discussing how the Eighth Amendment
includes a proportionality principle because it prohibits “excessive sanctions”).
174. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Id. Justice Scalia claims that if Americans had wanted a proportionality principle they
would have included one. Id. He also claims that no punishment would have been unusual because
the government was new and had no track record regarding criminal law. Id. However, criminal
law was in existence in the States, and “there would have been no lack of benchmarks for
determining unusualness.” Id. at 1011. If Justice Scalia’s argument was accepted, the Eighth
Amendment would have no meaning. Id. See also supra note 154 (discussing other weaknesses in
Scalia’s arguments).
176. Parr, supra note 163, at 60. Rehabilitation attempts to prevent future crime by creating a
positive change in offenders. Id. at 61. Deterrence uses the threat of punishment to “deter persons
at large (general deterrence) or particular individuals (specific deterrence) from offending or reoffending.” Id. at 60. Incapacitation reduces crime by physically restraining offenders from
committing additional crimes. Id.
177. Id.
178. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale
G. Parent’s Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines,
75 MINN. L. REV. 727, 741 (1991).
179. Parr, supra note 163, at 61. Retribution is expressing “censure for the particular conduct.”
Id.
180. Id. If two crimes are significantly different in seriousness, their punishments should be
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sentences to the seriousness of the offense.181
Another policy concern is that without a proportionality review,
there would be no check on state legislatures’ power.182 Imagine if a
state “legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment.”183 Without a proportionality principle, there would be
no way for the Supreme Court to strike down imposition of this type of
sentence.184
B. The Sentence in Lockyer Was Unconstitutional
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the
lower court’s decision in Lockyer was unconstitutional because it was
contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established law.185
However, the Supreme Court held the opposite.186 The first inquiry
under the AEDPA considers what law is clearly established.187 There is
not much disagreement that Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin are clearly
established federal law.188
The next step is to determine whether the decision was “contrary
to” or an “unreasonable application of” this clearly established federal
law.189 Contrary usually means “diametrically different, opposite in
significantly different. Id. If the two offenses do not differ much, then neither should their
sentences. Id.
181. Id. “Imposition of an unwarranted amount of punishment . . . is unprincipled and unjust.”
Parr, supra note 163, at 62.
182. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text for the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
186. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court’s decision.
187. Williams, 529 U.S. at 379. The area of relevant law is limited to the law determined by
the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 381. “A rule that ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government,’ falls outside this universe of federal law.” Id.
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). The law must also be “dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). If a law is
expressed in generalized terms rather than as a bright-line rule, it still may be clear enough for this
purpose. Id. at 382. Even if the rule requires a case-by-case examination, the multitude of
applications do not themselves create a new rule; the rule is still clearly established for the purposes
of the AEDPA. Id. (citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992) (opinion concurring in
judgment)).
188. Lockyer, 2001 WL 1528384, at *10. “A proper analysis of gross disproportionality
requires a comparison to all three cases.” Id. Under these cases, the court must first compare the
penalty’s harshness to the offense’s gravity to determine if an inference of gross disproportionality
is raised. Id. If there is such an inference, then the court must compare sentences imposed on
others in the same jurisdiction with the current sentence. Id. Next, the court must compare
sentences imposed for commission of the same offense in other jurisdictions. Id.
189. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
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character or nature, or mutually opposed.”190 The latter inquiry uses an
objectively unreasonable standard.191
Because Solem is clearly established federal law and the lower
court failed to review that case, the lower court unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law.192 However, the Supreme Court decided
that the only clearly established federal law was a gross
disproportionality principle.193 This is incorrect because a case that is
repeatedly applied as precedent cannot be unclear.194 The lower court
also unreasonably applied federal law by holding that Andrade’s
sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime.195 Many
sentences for crimes and prior strikes that were worse than Andrade’s
have been held to be grossly disproportionate.196 The Supreme Court
190. Id. at 698 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 (1976)). A
court violates the “contrary to” clause if it “applies a rule different from the governing law set forth
in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] have done on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-405). See
also Young v. Dretke, No. 02-50341, 2004 WL 42623, at *5 (5th Cir. Tex. 2004) (stating the same);
Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10 (2003) (stating the same). “A state court need not even be
aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them.’” Mitchell, 124 S.Ct. at 10.
191. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. A state court violates the “unreasonable application” clause of the
AEDPA if it “correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. See also Young, 2004 WL 42623 at
*5 (defining the phrase “unreasonable application of”).
192. See supra notes 139, 143 and accompanying text (discussing how Solem was clearly
established and why not applying it is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law).
193. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for this discussion.
194. See e.g. Ewing, 538 U.S. 11; Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1418; Lockyer, 2001 WL
1528384.
195. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing why the sentence in Lockyer was
grossly disproportionate). See also infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing why the
sentence in Lockyer was grossly disproportionate). Most violent crimes in California receive
shorter sentences than the one Andrade received. Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 677, 732 (2003). Andrade’s sentence was twice as long as any he would receive in
most other jurisdictions. Id. Only in Louisiana would Andrade have received such a severe
sentence. Id. at 733.
196. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Imposition of Enhanced Sentence Under Recidivist
Statute as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 27 A.L.R. FED. 110, § 7 (2004). A sentence imposed
under a valid recidivist statute may be unconstitutional if it fails to take into account the goals of
punishment, it is imposed only for the purpose of hurting the defendant, and it is grossly
disproportionate. Id. A defendant, whose prior strikes consisted of writing a bad check for $50,
transporting $140 worth of forged checks across state lines, and perjury, received a life sentence
which the court held to be grossly disproportionate under West Virginia’s valid recidivist statute.
Id. A life sentence received for heroin possession was grossly disproportionate when the maximum
sentence for a first time offender was three years. Id. A defendant convicted of petty theft should
not receive a life sentence. See WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 10, § 355. Earnest Bray Jr. was
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decided that Andrade’s sentence could not be held grossly
disproportionate because it fit within the unclear contours of the
proportionality principle.197 As discussed previously, the federal law
with regards to proportionality of sentences is clear enough to determine
that Andrade’s sentence is grossly disproportionate.198 If the Supreme
Court continues with its line of reasoning, no term-of-years sentence will
ever be found grossly disproportionate.199
The lower court also violated the AEDPA’s “contrary to” prong
because Solem is materially indistinguishable from Lockyer.200 The
Supreme Court’s main problem with holding that Solem and Lockyer are
on-point with each other is the fact that the defendant in Solem did not
have the possibility of parole and the defendant in Lockyer did.201
However, a minimum sentence of fifty years is the functional equivalent
of no parole; thus, the fact that a sentence contains the possibility of
parole should not carry a great deal of weight when determining
convicted of shoplifting videotapes which he blames on his use of drugs. Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit
in the Strike Zone: Judges Ask Sentencing Scheme Trailblazer to Argue Two More Appeals, S.F.
RECORDER, Nov. 20, 2001, at 1. He had prior convictions for armed robbery. Id. Richard Brown
was convicted of car theft. Id. His prior strikes occurred 10-15 years previously. Id. Both men
received 25-years-to-life sentences as opposed to Andrade’s sentence of 50 years to life. Id. See
also e.g. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371, 375 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that a
sentence of 20 years and a fine of $10,000 on each count for possession of marijuana with an intent
to distribute and distribution of marijuana was grossly disproportionate); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (finding that a sentence of 90 days for being a drug addict was cruel and
unusual because “even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’
of having a common cold”); Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 707, 710, 712 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a life sentence for a first-time conviction of .238 grams of cocaine base worth $33.33
was grossly disproportionate); Thompson v. Bock, No. 01-10021-BC, 2004 WL 306106, *2, *16
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (discussing that concurrent sentences of forty to sixty years for being a felon in
possession of a firearm is severe and the court would have chosen a lesser minimum sentence);
State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, ¶¶ 7, 10, 48 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that a minimum sentence of 52 years
imprisonment for “four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor” was disproportionate after taking
the particular facts into question).
197. See supra note 144 (discussing why the sentence in Lockyer was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law).
198. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing that Solem is clearly established
federal law).
199. Nathan H. Seltzer, Note, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between
Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U.L. REV. 921, 926 (2003). Only the
“unrealistic example of a life sentence for overtime parking” would qualify. Id.
200. See supra note 132 (discussing the analogy between the Solem and Lockyer cases). The
facts of Solem are on-point with the facts of Lockyer. Seltzer, supra note 199, at 928. By the Court
holding that they were distinguishable and that Andrade’s sentence was not grossly
disproportionate, it merely claims there is a proportionality principle but leaves it without any
meaning. Id.
201. See supra note 139 (discussing why Lockyer was not materially indistinguishable from
Solem).
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proportionality.202 Therefore, it is contrary to clearly established federal
law to reach a different conclusion than that which the Solem Court
reached, which was that the sentence was grossly disproportionate.203
C. The Policies Behind California’s Three Strikes Are Not Being Met
Three Strikes is intended to incapacitate those who threaten the
public safety and deter illegal conduct.204 However, offenders who
threaten public safety are not the ones who are usually affected by Three
Strikes.205 Individuals sentenced under Three Strikes tend to be older
202. See supra notes 132 (discussing how Andrade’s sentence with parole is analogous to the
sentence in Solem that does not include parole). But see Lugo v. Hickman, No. C 99-5196 WHA
(PR), 2003 WL 1798122 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that because the defendant had the possibility of
parole his sentence was distinguishable from Solem). Just because a convict is given a sentence that
includes the possibility of parole does not mean that he will be paroled, only that he would be
eligible for parole. Sonner v. State, 955 P.2d 673, 675 (Nev. 1998). The granting of parole does not
change a prisoner’s status as a convict. 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 61 (2003). A paroled
prisoner is still in the custody of the state. Id. “Parole is in legal effect imprisonment.” Id. In
addition, a lengthy sentence has the same effect as a life term. People v. Carson, 560 N.W.2d 657,
663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). See also State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, ¶¶ 7, 10, 48 (Ariz. 2003) (holding
that a sentence of 52 years without the possibility of parole was grossly disproportionate even
though the crime was four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor). Judge Paez found that the
fact that Andrade will be 87 years old before he is eligible for parole makes his sentence the
functional equivalent of a life sentence. Tony Mauro, Supremes Grant Review of Three Strikes
Cases, S.F. RECORDER, April 2, 2002. See also Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why
Life Without Parole Should Be A Sentencing Option in Texas, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 206 (1994)
(discussing how proponents of Texas’ forty-year minimum capital murder sentence see it as
equivalent to life without the possibility of parole). But see United States v. Ortiz, No. 93-5473 slip
op. at 2 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that there is no proportionality review for sentences of
less than life without the possibility of parole); United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding the same).
203. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 and see supra notes 75 and 82.
204. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15. See also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 1
(15th ed. 2003). The goals of Three Strikes is to keep the public safe by incarcerating recidivist and
to deter criminal conduct. Daniel Rogers, Note, People v. Fuhrman and Three Strikes: Have the
Traditional Goals of Recidivist Sentencing Been Sacrificed at the Altar of Public Passion?, 20 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 164 (1998).
205. David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strike” Laws on State
and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
557, 573-74 (2000). Three Strikes has been unsuccessful in targeting violent felons because its
application has mostly occurred in cases involving marijuana. Id. The main triggers for Three
Strikes are non-violent crimes and drug offenses. Id. at 574. These type of offenses account for
85% of those convicted under Three Strikes. Id.
[D]uring the first eight months of California’s three strikes law, 70% of those sentenced
under it were for nonviolent and drug related offenses, and 41% of those subject to three
strikes were there because of a property offense as opposed to 17% of those who
committed a second strike felony offense.
Id. “Between April 1994 and March 1996, only 14.5 percent of two-strikes sentences and 25.5
percent of three-strikes sentences were for crimes against the person.” Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of
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and, therefore, less likely to commit more crimes because they are at the
end of their criminal careers.206 The types of individuals who are most
greatly affected by Three Strikes are not those individuals whom Three
Strikes intended to incarcerate.207
Furthermore, Three Strikes is not deterring crime.208 A comparison
the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 159, 164 (2002). “Property crimes accounted for 41.1 percent of two-strikes
sentences and 38.8 percent of three-strikes sentences, while drug offenses accounted for 31.6
percent and 22 percent, respectively.” Id. “As of June 30, 2002, the total number of defendants
serving life in prison under Three Strikes for identifiable offenses was 7,148.” Ricciardulli, supra
note 41, at 32. “42.7% of the total defendants serving life were there due to non-serious current
offenses.” Id.
Of this total, in 344 cases, or 4.8%, the current offense was petty theft with a prior; in
115 of the cases, or 1.6%, the current offense was non-vehicular grand theft; 457 cases,
or 6.4%, were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in 647 cases, or 9.1%, the current
offense was possession of controlled substances for personal use.
Id.
206. Gordon, supra note 8, at 586. The most violent criminals tend to be under the age of 24.
Id. Criminal behavior normally declines as a person enters his thirties and forties. Id. “[F]elony
offenders in their 30s and 40s are eight and ten times, respectively, more likely to be sentenced
under Three Strikes than felons in their early 20s.” Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The
Failure of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 66
(1999). However, Three Strikes will necessarily affect the older criminals who have had a chance
to accumulate a criminal record. Gordon, supra note 8, at 586. “From 1978 to 1998, annual felony
arrests of adults over age 30 increased by almost 167,000, while arrests of adults between ages 20
and 29 increased by just over 32,000.” Males & Macallair, supra, at 66. While California’s
population’s age increased by four years, the age of an arrestee increased by seven years. Id. After
age 28, there is a steady and serious decline in criminal activity. Id. at 68. The effects of
incapacitation are maximized when the most serious offenders are incarcerated. Alex R. Piquero,
David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359,
465 (2003). More crimes will be averted when high offenders are incapacitated during the time
when they are at a high risk of offending. Id. at 466. Incapacitation policies are more effective
when used during active criminal careers as opposed to when careers are in a downswing. Id.
207. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 280. Considering the murders that prompted the passage of
Three Strikes, it is clear that the law intended to keep serious or violent convicts incarcerated. Id. at
278. The pamphlets distributed to voters for the Three Strikes proposal stated that Three Strikes
“would keep ‘rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where they belong.’” Id. at 280.
See also id. at 280 n.20. Therefore, the voters did not intend that Three Strikes would “result in
numerous life sentences for petty theft convictions.” Id. at 280-81. Even Polly Klaas’ father knew
that Three Strikes was not working as intended, and he withdrew his support for it stating “‘we
blindly supported the . . . initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with violent crimes.’”
Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown Promises,
90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 264 (2002) (book review) [hereinafter Vitiello, Hard Look].
208. See Franklin E. Zimring & Sam Kamin, Facts, Fallacies, and California’s Three Strikes,
40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002) (discussing how Three Strikes is not reducing crime). While crime
rates declined after March 1994 in nine major California cities, the crime rate had begun to decline
17 months before Three Strikes was enacted and crime continued to drop at the same rate after
enactment. Id. at 605-06. Crime in California was only reduced by six-tenths of one percent after
enactment of Three Strikes. Id. at 606. The deterrent effect of Three Strikes is only between zero
and two percent of California crime. Id. at 606-07. The California Crime Index was not decreased
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of states that have Three Strikes laws and States that do not shows that
Three Strikes laws do not deter crime.209 Three Strikes has no effect on
the criminal mentality.210 A growing body of research establishes that
increased rates of incarceration do not translate into lowered crime rates
Crime rates have fluctuated while
as previously assumed.211
by Three Strikes below what was expected by pre-existing trends. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl
Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST.
143, 177 (2003). The sharp decline in crime directly after Three Strikes enactment cannot be
explained by that enactment. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 268. The results of longer
prison terms would not kick in immediately. Id. The results would not come into effect until after
an offender served the portion of his sentence he would have served anyway absent Three Strikes.
Id. “Many criminologists suggest that the crime rate is dropping faster in California than elsewhere
in the nation due to factors such as ‘a strong economy, a decreasing number of people in their
crime-prone years, and fewer turf battles among crack cocaine dealers.’” Id. at 270. “Crime
dropped 21.3% in the six counties that have been the most lenient in enforcing Three Strikes, while
the toughest counties experienced only a 12.7% drop in their crime rates.” Id.; Michael Vitiello,
Three Strikes Law: A Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime?, 29-SPG HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2002)
[hereinafter Vitiello, Real or Imagined]. See also Males & Macallair, supra note 206, at 67-68
(comparing the crime rates in counties that invoked Three Strikes frequently with those that are
more lenient). Sacramento and Los Angeles counties use Three Strikes seven times more than
Alameda and San Francisco counties who rarely use the law, but they do not have a larger decrease
in crime. Id. at 68. “San Francisco County, which had the lowest rate of Three Strike
commitments, experienced a 35 percent decline in homicides, a 33 percent decline in all violent
crimes, and a 28 percent decline in all index crimes.” Id. “Sacramento County, which had the
highest rate of three strike commitments, [only] experienced a 23 percent decline in homicides, a 10
percent decline in all violent crimes, and a 7 percent decline in all index crimes.” Id. “Santa Clara
[County], the sixth most frequent county to employ the ‘Three Strikes’ law, experienced a rise in
violent crimes after the ‘Three Strikes’ law went into effect.” Tina M. Olson, Comment, Strike One,
Ready for More?: The Consequences of Plea Bargaining “First Strike” Offenders Under
California’s “Three Strikes” Law, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 545, 560 (2000).
209. Doob & Webster, supra note 208, at 175. “From 1994-1995, violent crime in non-three
strikes states fell nearly three times more rapidly than in three-strikes states.” Id. “In non-threestrikes states, violent crime fell by 4.6 percent.” Id. “In states which have passed three-strikes laws,
crime fell by only 1.7 percent.” Id. “From 1994-1995, total crime decreased by an average of 0.4
percent in the three-strikes states and decreased by an average of 1.2 percent in states which have
not implemented the three-strikes law.” Id.
210. Id. at 182. Sixty prisoners who had been in prison at least twice and at least once for
armed robbery or burglary were interviewed. Doob & Webster, supra note 208, at 182. They stated
that they did not consider the legal consequences when planning their crimes nor they think about
getting caught. Id. Fifty-two of the prisoners never thought they would be caught; therefore, their
possible sentence was unimportant. Id. Thirty-two of the prisoners did not even know what their
punishments might be. Id. For those that had stopped committing crimes, reasons other than
punishment were reported. Id.
211. Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1492. See also Symposium, The
Impact of Truth-In-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets,
and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75 (1999) (discussing that there is no correlation
between increased incarceration and lower crime rates). Massive increases in incarceration have
failed to translate into a noticeable reduction in crime rates. Thomas C. Castellano, Limits of the
Criminal Sanction in Controlling Crime: A Plea for Balanced Punishments, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427,
433 (1999). A study by Irwin and Austin found that changes in crime rates between 1980 and 1991
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incarceration rates have experienced steady increases.212 The overall
crime rate in California rose 2.4% in 2003.213 Instead of lowering crime
rates, increased incarceration, may actually be increasing them.214
D. Three Strikes Does Not Make Sense Financially
It costs $21,000 to $22,000 a year to incarcerate one prisoner, and
the prison population is increasing dramatically due to Three Strikes.215
It costs even more to incarcerate an aging prisoner, who Three Strikes is

were not strongly related to increases in incarceration. Id. Between 1985 and 1995 the
incarceration rate in the United States increased by 92%, but there was little impact on crime rates.
Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All the Children Gone?: A Look At Incarcerated Youth in
America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2435, 2440 (2001). Frequent offenders are more likely to be
imprisoned than less frequent offenders; therefore, offending rates among prisoners are higher than
among those who are free. David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in
American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 461-62 (2001). A study by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences found that the time served per violent crime
from 1975 to 1989 when tripled had no measurable impact on violent crime rates. Id. at 462. The
chances of being arrested for committing a crime in the United States are low. Florida Corrections
Commission, Crime Rates and Incarceration Rates: A Critical Review of the Literature, available at
http://fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/rates/rate.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Criminals know this;
therefore, deterrence does not work. Id. Many factors influence crime. Id. The relationship
between crime rates and incarceration is greatly weakened when factors other than incarceration are
included. Id.
212. Mauer, Promises, supra note 9, at 12. New York is an illustrative example of the lack of
correlation between increased incarceration and lowering crime rates. Id. New York violent crime
rates declined 34% between 1990 and 1995 and property crime rates dropped 39%. Id. However,
New York City’s jail population actually declined and New York state’s prison population barely
rose above the rate of increase of the national prison population. Id.
213. Three Strikes and You’re Out Official Website, Three Strikes Information, available at
http://threestrikes.org/articles.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
214. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 596-97 (2003). Diana Rose and Todd Clear, two researchers at the City University of
New York, found that crime rates went up after a certain incarceration level is reached. Eric
Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a
War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 80 n.95 (2002). Increased incarceration rates
have weakened the communities’ capacity to “raise children, provide a healthy environment for
families, provide jobs for young and old, and sustain a vibrant civic life.” Id. It is this weakening
that has increased crime rates as incarceration rates increase. Id. The children of incarcerated
parents are six times more likely than children without imprisoned parents to become incarcerated.
Conward, supra note 211, at 2440.
215. Ardaiz, supra, note 48 at 27. As of 1998, at least 1,300 people had been incarcerated in
California under Three Strikes. Cowart, supra note 3, at 643. See also supra, note 205 (discussing
how many people have been imprisoned under Three Strikes and how often California uses the
law). It is believed that to achieve a 10% drop in the crime rate, the prison population will have to
double. Piquero, Farrington & Blumstein, supra note 206, at 381. Another effect Three Strikes will
have on the prison population is that the number of older prisoners will increase and they cost the
state more to incarcerate than younger criminals. Vitiello, Real or Imagined, supra note 208, at 4.
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most likely to effect.216 Some say that these costs are offset by society’s
economic benefits from reduced crime rates.217 However, as discussed
previously, crime rates are not being reduced.218 “Increased funds
are . . . necessary to maintain the prison housing of . . . inmates, as
opposed to less costly methods of punishment.”219 Higher education will
take the hit in the state budget for these extra costs.220 Variations on
216. Nkechi Taifa, “Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”—Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third
Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 722 (1995). Three Strikes keeps prisoners in jail until
they are well beyond the age of criminal activity. Id. However, only one percent of crime is
committed by individuals over the age of sixty. Id. Absent Three Strikes, young criminals are still
kept in prison after a third violent felony well past middle age when the risk they pose on society is
small. Id. The cost of incarcerating an aging criminal is three times more than the cost of
incarcerating the average prisoner. Id. “Three younger, more violent-prone offenders could be held
in the place of one geriatric prisoner.” Id.
217. Ardaiz, supra note 49, at 27. See also Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington,
Monetary Costs and Benefits of Crime Prevention Programs, 27 CRIME & JUST. 305, 305-06 (2000)
(discussing the tangible and intangible costs of crime).
218. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing how crime is not being
deterred by Three Strikes).
219. Cowart, supra note 3, at 632.
220. Loren L. Barr, Comment, The “Three Strikes” Dilemma: Crime Reduction At Any Price?,
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 107, 129 (1995). “The RAND study concludes that three strikes will cost
Californians an additional $5.5 billion annually, or about $16,000 per serious crime prevented.” Id.
at 128. Prior to the enactment of Three Strikes, state spending was as follows: “36% for K-12
education, 35% for health and welfare, 12% for higher education, 9% for miscellaneous services
such as pollution control and workplace safety, and 9% for corrections.” Id. By 2002, Three
Strikes will increase the budget allocation for corrections to 18%. Id. This will increase taxes by
$300 per year per taxpayer or one of the other budget areas could be cut. Id. Increasing taxes is
unlikely at this point in California given the current political situation. Id. at 129. The budget for
primary education cannot be reduced because it has a set minimum level. Barr, supra, at 129. The
budgets for welfare and health have been growing each year, therefore, spending cuts are unlikely to
come from these areas. Id. By 2002, “the state will be spending 46% of its general fund on primary
education, 35% on health and welfare, and 18% on corrections, leaving a virtually nonexistent 1%
for the combined higher education and miscellaneous services that now consume 21% of the state
budget.” Id. However, Three Strikes may not be implemented as planned. James Austin, “Three
Strikes and You’re Out”: The Likely Consequences on the Courts, Prisons, and Crime in California
and Washington State, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 239, 247 (1994). With prosecutor’s discretion,
they could eliminate prior strikes in order to facilitate plea bargaining. Id. But see infra notes 24144 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of judicial integrity resulting from prosecutorial
discretion); infra note 233 (discussing that most Three Strikes cases are not being pled). Proponents
of Three Strikes argue that only a few thousand more individuals will be incarcerated over two
decades. Robert Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: “Three Strikes and You’re
Out,” 20 J. LEGIS. 213, 224 (1994). See also Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social
Benefits of Confining Habitual Criminals, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 61 (1999) (discussing that
the actual prison population is much less than that predicted by RAND when it projected the costs
of Three Strikes). Many of these prisoners would be recidivist and would keep costing the system
more money for repeatedly going through the judicial system. Heglin, supra, at 224. See also
Meredith McClain, Note, Three Strikes and You’re Out”: The Solution to the Repeat Offender
Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 121-22 (1996) (discussing that it costs more to prosecute
recidivists than to keep them imprisoned and Three Strikes only affects a small number of
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Three Strikes that cost less, such as requiring the third strike to be a
serious felony, are possible, but they would also be less effective at
crime reduction.221
Since Three Strikes was passed, jury trials and their related
expenses have increased by 40% in California.222 “Defendants charged
under [Three Strikes] seek a [jury] trial in hope for acquittal instead of
opting for the certainty of enhanced sentences under the second or third
strike.”223 Court resources are being diverted to adjudicating Three
Strikes cases and away from civil cases.224 Some counties have tried
recidivists). The intangible costs of crime, such as the loss of life or physical injury and property
loss, far outweigh the monetary costs of Three Strikes. Heglin, supra, at 224. Billions are spent to
compensate victims for these types of loss and to prosecute habitual offenders. Derrick A. Carter,
Reflections of the Proposed Federal Crime Bill, 8-JUN NBA NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 23, 23 (1994).
See also Scheidegger, supra, at 61-63 (discussing the intangible costs of crime); Ilene M. Shinbein,
Note, “Three-Strikes and You’re Out”: A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, But a Failure in
Its Application, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175, 199-200 (1996) (discussing
that billions are spent on the costs of crime other than those related to prosecuting criminals). But
see supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the number of individuals that have been
imprisoned under Three Strikes); supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme
cost of Three Strikes and the areas of California’s budget that will suffer).
221. Peter W. Greenwood et al., California’s New Three-Strikes Law: Benefits, Costs, and
Alternatives, RAND, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB4009/RB4009.word.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
222. Cowart, supra note 3, at 661. Four percent of all felonies in Los Angeles go to trial, but
25% of Three Strikes cases are going to trial. Schultz, supra note 215, at 575. “Second- and thirdstrike cases account for forty-eight percent of the state’s jury trials.” Joshua E. Bowers, “The
Integrity of the Game is Everything”: The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1194 (2001). Typical jury trials do not last as long as Three Strikes trials
because more motions are filed by defendants and they fight harder. Id. at 1194-95. In addition,
there has to be a second trial for sentencing. Id. at 1195. California trial times have increased to
106 days from 46 days for second strike cases and to 160 days for third-strike cases. Id. San Diego
County predicts a tripling and Santa Clara County predicts a doubling of jury trials. Harvey Gee,
New Paradigms of Criminal Justice for the Twenty-First Century: A Review Essay, 27 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 29, 64 (2000).
223. Schultz, supra note 215, at 575. See also Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study
of San Diego County’s Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from July – December 1996, 11 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 29, 35 (1999) (discussing the increase in Three Strikes jury trials). Only fourteen
percent of second-strike cases are pled out and only six percent of third-strike cases have ended this
way. J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1089
(1995). “The result . . . is more trials, more public costs for prosecutors, and more costs associated
with public defenders who represent most of those coming to bat for three strike felonies.” Schultz,
supra note 215, at 575. “Because many three strikers are either unable or ineligible to make bail
and more of them demand trials, local jails have become more crowded.” Id. at 580. Therefore, the
costs of housing more individuals and paying for more security personnel to guard them have
increased. Id. Pretrial detention has increased 11% in California local jails as a result of Three
Strikes. Id. Many criminals sentenced under Three Strikes were convicted of drug crimes, but drug
treatment programs or traditional sentences are less expensive than Three Strikes sentences. Id.
224. Gee, supra note 232, at 63. Nine out of twenty courts have indicated a lack of courtrooms
for civil trials. Id. Three out of ten superior court districts are no longer hearing civil cases. Kline,
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creative solutions to help with the increased jury trials and expenses
such as asking for reimbursement from the state, allocating specialists to
hear Three Strikes cases, releasing prisoners early, and increasing
budgets.225
E. Three Strikes Does Not Allow for the Maintenance of Judicial
Integrity
The monetary expense of Three Strikes will result in a loss of
judicial system integrity.226 There will not be enough prosecutors to try
Three Strikes cases.227 Therefore, prosecutors will use their discretion to
avoid Three Strikes trials instead of applying the law.228 Judges have
also found ways to avoid imposing enhanced sentences under Three
Strikes even though they are not supposed to have the power to do so.229
Judges and prosecutors are not the only ones who have found ways to
avoid imposing Three Strikes; witnesses, jurors and victims have also
done so.230
supra note 233, at 1090. Half of the district courtrooms have been changed from civil to criminal
trials. Id. The Los Angeles Superior Court predicts that eventually two-thirds to three-fourths of
civil courtrooms will be diverted to criminal trials. Id. Because of a shortage of criminal judges,
many civil judges have been reassigned to criminal courts. Gee, supra note 232, at 64. Twenty-five
percent of the courts are so overcome with criminal trials that they can no longer hear civil cases.
Id.
225. Gee, supra note 232, at 64. Los Angeles County submitted a claim to the state seeking
reimbursement of $169 million for Three Strikes costs from 1994-1996. Id. San Diego County
implemented a program where specialists, including public defenders, judges, and prosecutors, hear
Three Strikes cases. Id. Some counties have increased their criminal justice agencies’ budgets and
others have shifted resources away from civil cases to criminal cases. E. D’Angelo, Office of the
Legislative Analyst, 15-WTR CAL. REG. L. REP. 28, 30 (1995). Other counties have begun releasing
non-Three Strikes inmates from jail early. Id.
226. Barr, supra note 230, at 135.
227. Id. at 136. Defendants will be advised by their attorneys to assert their right to a speedy
trial. Id. at 135. However, since there will be so many Three Strikes trials, there will not be enough
prosecutors to try all these cases. Id.
228. Id. at 136. Some defendants will not be charged or will be charged to lesser offenses to
avoid longer Three Strikes jury trials. Id. “Wobblers that should probably be charged as felonies
will be charged as misdemeanors to avoid a three strikes jury trial.” Barr, supra note 230, at 136.
“Prosecutors will be forced to strike the prior convictions of two and three strike defendants who the
public would expect to receive, and who may well deserve, enhanced three strike sentences.” Id.
Some prosecutors just choose to ignore Three Strikes’ ban on plea bargaining. Erik G. Luna,
Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 25 (1998).
229. Luna, supra, note 238 at 24. Judges have dismissed prior strikes in order to place the
defendant outside the sentencing scheme of Three Strikes. Id. Judges have reduced crimes which
were clearly felonies to misdemeanors. Id. Finally, some judges just do not apply Three Strikes.
Id.
230. Id. at 25. Two times burglary victims refused to testify because they feared the burglars
would receive a life sentence. Id. See also supra note 8 (discussing other times victims, jurors, and
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Three Strikes was not intended to be a discretionary law and yet is
has become one.231 The amount of discretion invested in prosecutors
alone results in a loss of judicial integrity.232 Differing approaches to
enforcing Three Strikes reflect a prosecutor’s individual principles, and
not the legislature’s intent.233 The discretion invested in prosecutors
increases their plea bargaining power, thereby tilting the playing field
drastically and unfairly in their favor.234
F. How Does California’s Three Strikes Law Compare with Similar
Laws
California’s Three Strikes law is the harshest of its kind,235 and is
witnesses have circumvented imposition of Three Strikes).
231. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1183. Voters intended Three Strikes to end discretion by
ending indeterminate sentences. Id. However, all they accomplished was to switch discretion from
the judge to the prosecutor. Id. See also infra note 243 (discussing the discretion granted
prosecutors under Three Strikes and its implications).
232. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1185. “Prosecutors in California’s more populous counties
[are] more likely to strike some offenses than others.” Schultz, supra note 215, at 575. Equal
protection issues are raised by a law that invests prosecutors with this amount of discretion.
Gordon, supra note 8, 578 at n.314. The differences between counties “is an arbitrary factor and
has no relation to culpability.” Id. “Studies also indicate that local political pressures seem to
determine the use of three strikes.” Schultz, supra note 215, at 575. “In addition, the lack of
flexibility has discouraged prosecutors from using these laws, and they prefer to employ other
preexisting habitual offender laws already on the books.” Id. The application of Three Strikes
seems to depend on which county an individual is charged under. Shepherd, supra note 215, at 164.
The “southern part of the state is very stringent in its application, whereas counties in the urban
northern areas are ‘cautious’ in enforcing the law.” Id. The fact that prosecutors are invested with
too much discretion is exemplified by the odd fact that those who committed a single violent felony
were sentenced to two years more in prison than those who committed two violent felonies. Charles
R. Calleros, In the Spirit of Regina Austin’s Contextual Analysis: Exploring Racial Context in Legal
Method, Writing Assignments and Scholarship, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 281, 295 (2000). But see
Ardaiz, supra note 49, at 24-5 (discussing that the public gives prosecutors discretion because it is
their job to keep the community safe and, in order to maintain consistency, all discretion would
have to be eliminated which would result in all third-strikers being treated the same regardless of
the facts and circumstances of the case).
233. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1187. Prosecutors cannot claim that discretion is required
based on the individual characteristics of those charged under Three Strikes. Id. However, some
prosecutors, such as San Francisco District Attorney Terrence Hallinan, apply or don’t apply the
law to entire classes of individuals without basing the decision on individual characteristics. Id.
234. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes Law,
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 489 (2002). In return for a guilty plea on the current offense,
prosecutors will not charge strike enhancements. Id. See also supra note 238 (discussing the evils
of allowing prosecutors to choose not to charge second and third strike enhancements). The
defendant is no longer completely free to choose whether to accept or reject an offer made by the
prosecutor’s office. Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea
Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 589 (1999).
235. See Ides, supra note 205, at 732 (reviewing the Lockyer case). The two other leading three
strikes states, Washington and Wisconsin, do not have a rate of incarceration anywhere near that of
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dramatically different from other states.236 This is exemplified by the
fact that California has sentenced more offenders under Three Strikes
than any other state,237 and permits less serious offenses to trigger the
law.238
Forty-one states other than California have enacted recidivist
statutes.239 Unlike California, twenty-five of those states require prior
convictions to be “brought and tried separately” in order to qualify as
strikes.240
California. Cowart, supra note 3, at 625. See also Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 1433 (discussing
that Three Strikes is one of the most severe laws of its kind); WITKIN, EPSTEIN & MEMBERS OF THE
WITKIN LEGAL INSTITUTE, supra note 10 § 355 (discussing that California is the only state where a
person could receive a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for shoplifting a bottle of
vitamins); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55, 55 n.6 (2001) (discussing that California leads the nation in
toughness and enforcing its three strikes law).
236. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 262.
237. Id. at 263. “The number of Three Strikes cases in California dwarfs the number of similar
cases in all of the other states and the federal system combined.” Id. California uses its law more
than any other state. Id. For example, even though California is six times more populous than
Washington, it uses Three Strikes 33 times more than Washington uses their three strikes law. Id.
The federal system has only sentenced 35 offenders under their three strikes law since it was
enacted in 1994 through 1996. Id. During the same period, California sentenced 40,000 offenders
under Three Strikes. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 263. There have only been 121 three
strikes convictions in Washington through August 1998. Schultz, supra note 215, at 572-73.
Florida only had 116 convictions through June 1998. Id. at 573. In Colorado, North Carolina, New
Mexico, Tennessee and Pennsylvania, there have been five or less offenders sentenced under each
state’s three strikes laws through August 1998. Id. Wisconsin has sentenced three offenders under
its three strikes laws, New Jersey has sentenced six, and Utah has not sentenced any under its three
strikes laws. Id.
238. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 262. Most other laws only target violent crime,
but California includes residential burglary as a triggering offense. Id. The third triggering strike in
California does not have to be for a violent crime and can even include crimes that could have been
charged as misdemeanors. Mauro, supra note 202.
239. Rogers, supra note 204, 159-60. Twenty-four states and the federal government enacted
three-strike laws between 1993 and 1995. John Clark, James Austin, & D. Alan Henry, ‘Three
Strikes and You’re Out’: Are Repeat Offender Laws Having Their Anticipated Effects?, 81
JUDICATURE 144, 144 (1998).
240. Rogers, supra note 204, at 160. Some states specifically require this; others have a
requirement like this within the statutory language. Id. Wyoming is an example of a state that
explicitly requires this. Id. Georgia and Illinois are examples of states that that have comparable
language in their statutes. Id. More specifically, Illinois requires that for a second offense to
qualify as a second strike, the second offense must be committed after the individual is convicted of
a first qualifying offense. Id. at 161. Nearly all states and the federal government have some type
of minimum sentencing requirements. Marguerite A. Driessen & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Sentencing
Dissonances in the United States: The Shrinking Distance Between Punishment Proposed and
Sanction Served, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 635 (2002). Thirty-nine states have truth-in-sentencing
laws, twenty-four states have strikes laws, and seventeen states have sentencing guidelines for
certain crimes. Id. No state has abolished parole boards or similar organizations that release
prisoners. Id.
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Two other statutes are comparable in harshness to Three Strikes,
Washington and Texas.241 However, even though Washington’s statute
is considered harsh, it still requires the third strike to be a serious felony
rather than just any felony.242 Texas goes beyond this to require the
third strike to be a violent felony.243
G. Three Strikes Is Creating Violence Instead of Decreasing It
Offenders facing Three Strikes sentencing tend to be more violent
than they normally would be.244 The type of prison overcrowding as a
result of Three Strikes is a cause of prison violence.245 Even increased
recidivism can be traced to prison violence and overcrowding.246
Increased recidivism and violence runs completely contrary to the goals
of Three Strikes.247
241. Mark W. Owens, Note, California’s Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require
Desperate Measures – But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881, 898 (1995).
242. Id. at 899. Washington statutes specifically enumerate the felonies that qualify for each
strike. Clark, Austin & Henry, supra note 239, at 145.
243. Owens, supra, note 241, at 899. Texas also permits judges to use their discretion to
sentence third-strike defendants to lesser sentences. Id.
244. Cowart, supra note 3, at 633. “Such felons will do whatever it takes to resist arrest by
police officers, or will threaten, injure, or kill witnesses who may testify against them.” Id. For
example, Kevin Lee Robinson planned to bomb several county administrative buildings in order to
destroy his criminal records and avoid being sentenced under Three Strikes. Id. at 666. Another
example is Clinton James Warner who committed suicide so that he would not have to serve a
possible life sentence for drug possession under Three Strikes. Id. A high rate of resisting arrest by
third-strikers has been experienced by San Francisco police officers. Luna, supra note 228, at 31.
For criminals serving life or extremely long sentences, the threat of another conviction is unlikely to
prevent violence against inmates or prison guards. Id. The amount of violence against prison
guards has doubled since the enactment of Three Strikes. Id. A Milwaukee, Oregon corrections
officer, Dave Paul, wrote “[i]magine a law enforcement officer trying to arrest a twice-convicted
felon who has nothing to lose by using any means necessary to escape. Expect assaults on police
and correctional officers to rise precipitously.” ACLU, 10 Reasons to Oppose “3 Strikes, You’re
Out,” at http://archive.aclu.org/library/pbr4.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
245. Cowart, supra note 3, at 644. This includes “assaultive or disruptive behavior.” Id.
246. Id. Prison overcrowding and increased violence can cause recidivism. Id. Many
offenders sentenced under Three Strikes are nonviolent offenders. Id. As a result of prison
violence, these nonviolent criminals may become violent after they are released even though they
exhibited no violent tendencies before incapacitation. Id. at 644-45. In addition, because prisons
will become filled with third-strikers, officials will have to release other prisoners before they have
fully served their time. Luna, supra note 228, at 32. This may include releasing violent criminals in
order to make room for recidivist who are most likely at the end of their criminal career. Id. See
also supra note 216 (discussing aging prisoners). Sherman Block, Los Angeles County Sheriff, had
to release what he believed to be more violent criminals in order to make room for Three Strikes
defendants. Luna, supra note 228, at 32. Thirty-three thousand inmates in Orange County
California were released early due to overcrowding in prisons in 1996. Id. Sixty-four of the
inmates released were sex offenders. Id.
247. Cowart, supra note 3, at 645. See also supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing
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V. CONCLUSION
Three Strikes is the harshest law of its kind in any state and federal
system, and it is clear that there are serious problems which require its
repeal.248 The law will prove to cost much more than it will ever save.249
The policies and benefits that prompted the passage of Three Strikes are
not being achieved.250 To the contrary, the law may be turning
nonviolent criminals into violent ones.251 In addition, judicial integrity
is declining due to the prosecutorial discretion inherent in Three
Strikes.252
Even absent the problems that are inherent in Three Strikes, it
suffers from the most fatal flaw of all; it results in decisions that violate
the Eighth Amendment.253 The Three Strikes sentence in Lockyer is
unconstitutional.254 It violated the Eighth Amendment because it was
disproportionate to the crime committed and, as discussed previously,
there is a proportionality principle inherent in the Eighth Amendment.255
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have been permitted to
overturn the sentence under the AEDPA because the decision was
“contrary to” and an “unreasonable application of” clearly established
federal law.256 The decision was “contrary to” the law because the trial
court failed to follow materially indistinguishable precedent, namely
Solem.257 The decision was also an “unreasonable application of” the
the goals of Three Strikes); Ardaiz, supra note 48, at 1-2 (discussing the same).
248. See supra notes 42-43, 235-43 and accompanying text (comparing Three Strikes to the
same type of law in other states and the federal system).
249. See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text (discussing the financial impact of Three
Strikes).
250. See supra notes 201-11 and accompanying text (discussing the policy goals of Three
Strikes and whether or not they are being met).
251. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in violence
caused by Three Strikes).
252. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutorial discretion is
causing the loss of judicial integrity).
253. See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text (discussing that there is a
disproportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment).
254. See supra notes 185-203 (discussing why the Supreme Court should have upheld the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that Andrade’s sentence was unconstitutional).
255. See supra note 139 (discussing how the sentence in Lockyer was disproportionate to the
crime committed); 163-92 (discussing that the Eighth Amendment contains a disproportionality
principle).
256. See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text (discussing how the AEDPA permitted the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn the sentence in Lockyer because it was disproportionate
and contrary to clearly established precedent, namely Solem).
257. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (finding that Solem is materially
indistinguishable from Lockyer and should have been applied to Andrade’s sentence to determine
that it was grossly disproportionate).
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law because the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed.258
Joy M. Donham

258. See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text (discussing that the sentence in Lockyer
was grossly disproportionate to the crime Andrade committed).
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